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## T 1

#### Restrictions are prohibitions

Jean Schiedler-Brown 12, Attorney, Jean Schiedler-Brown & Associates, Appellant Brief of Randall Kinchloe v. States Dept of Health, Washington, The Court of Appeals of the State of Washington, Division 1, http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/Briefs/A01/686429%20Appellant%20Randall%20Kincheloe%27s.pdf

3. The ordinary definition of the term "restrictions" also does not include the reporting and monitoring or supervising terms and conditions that are included in the 2001 Stipulation. ¶ Black's Law Dictionary, 'fifth edition,(1979) defines "restriction" as; ¶ A limitation often imposed in a deed or lease respecting the use to which the property may be put. The term "restrict' is also cross referenced with the term "restrain." Restrain is defined as; To limit, confine, abridge, narrow down, restrict, obstruct, impede, hinder, stay, destroy. To prohibit from action; to put compulsion on; to restrict; to hold or press back. To keep in check; to hold back from acting, proceeding, or advancing, either by physical or moral force, or by interposing obstacle, to repress or suppress, to curb. ¶ In contrast, the terms "supervise" and "supervisor" are defined as; To have general oversight over, to superintend or to inspect. See Supervisor. A surveyor or overseer. . . In a broad sense, one having authority over others, to superintend and direct. The term "supervisor" means an individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibility to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but required the use of independent judgment. ¶ Comparing the above definitions, it is clear that the definition of "restriction" is very different from the definition of "supervision"-very few of the same words are used to explain or define the different terms. In his 2001 stipulation, Mr. Kincheloe essentially agreed to some supervision conditions, but he did not agree to restrict his license.

#### The plan offers oversight- its review not a prohibition of authority

#### Limits- justifies tiny affs that don’t alter the SQ

#### Ground- all core link ground is to actually limiting the presidents authority

#### Precision- only our interpretation defines “restrictions on authority”- that’s key to adequate preparation and policy analysis

#### F/x T- it is not in itself a prohibition- mixes burdens and causes unpredictable steps

#### Extra T---they increase Pakistan’s authority, NOT congressional authority

## T 2

#### Targeted killings are strikes carried about against pre-meditated, individually designated targets---plan includes all drone strikes and signature strikes which are distinct

Kenneth Anderson 11, Professor at Washington College of Law, American University, Hoover Institution visiting fellow, Non-Resident Visiting Fellow at Brookings, “Distinguishing High Value Targeted Killing and ‘Signature’ Attacks on Taliban Fighters,” August 29 2011, http://www.volokh.com/2011/08/29/distinguishing-high-value-targeted-killing-and-signature-attacks-on-taliban-fighters/

From the US standpoint, it is partly that it does not depend as much as it did on Pakistan’s intelligence. But it is also partly, as a couple of well-publicized incidents a few months ago made clear, that sharing targeting decisions with Pakistan’s military and ISI runs a very considerable possibility of having the targets tipped off (as even The Onion has observed). The article notes in this regard, the U.S. worries that “if they tell the Pakistanis that a drone strike is coming someone within Pakistani intelligence could tip off the intended target.” However, the Journal’s reporting goes from there to emphasize an aspect of targeted killing and drone warfare that is not sufficiently appreciated in public discussions trying to assess such issues as civilian collateral damage, strategic value and uses, and the uses of drones in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency as distinct activities. The article explains:¶ The CIA carries out two different types of drone strikes in the tribal areas of Pakistan—those against so-called high-value targets, including Mr. Rahman, and “signature” strikes targeting Taliban foot-soldiers who criss-cross the border with Afghanistan to fight U.S. forces there.¶ High-value targets are added to a classified list that the CIA maintains and updates. The agency often doesn’t know the names of the signature targets, but it tracks their movements and activities for hours or days before striking them, U.S. officials say.¶ Another way to put this is that, loosely speaking, the high value targets are part of a counterterrorism campaign – a worldwide one, reaching these days to Yemen and other places. It is targeted killing in its strict sense using drones – aimed at a distinct individual who has been identified by intelligence. The “signature” strikes, by contrast, are not strictly speaking “targeted killing,” because they are aimed at larger numbers of fighters who are targeted on the basis of being combatants, but not on the basis of individuated intelligence. They are fighting formations, being targeted on a mass basis as part of the counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan, as part of the basic CI doctrine of closing down cross-border safe havens and border interdiction of fighters. Both of these functions can be, and are, carried out by drones – though each strategic function could be carried out by other means, such as SEAL 6 or CIA human teams, in the case of targeted killing, or manned aircraft in the case of attacks on Taliban formations. The fundamental point is that they serve distinct strategic purposes. Targeted killing is not synonymous with drone warfare, just as counterterrorism is analytically distinct from counterinsurgency. (I discuss this in the opening sections of this draft chapter on SSRN.)¶ This analytic point affects how one sees the levels of drone attacks going up or down over the years. Neither the total numbers of fighters killed nor the total number of drone strikes – going up or down over months – tells the whole story. Total numbers do not distinguish between the high value targets, being targeted as part of the top down dismantling of Al Qaeda as a transnational terrorist organization, on the one hand, and ordinary Taliban being killed in much larger numbers as part of counterinsurgency activities essentially part of the ground war in Afghanistan, on the other. Yet the distinction is crucial insofar as the two activities are, at the level of truly grand strategy, in support of each other – the war in Afghanistan and the global counterterrorism war both in support of the AUMF and US national security broadly – but at the level of ordinary strategic concerns, quite distinct in their requirements and conduct. If targeted killing against AQ leadership goes well in Pakistan, those might diminish at some point in the future; what happens in the war against the Afghan Taliban is distinct and has its own rhythm, and in that effort, drones are simply another form of air weapon, an alternative to manned aircraft in an overt, conventional war. Rising or falling numbers of drone strikes in the aggregate will not tell one very much without knowing what mission is at issue.

#### Vote neg

#### Precision- they are different literature bases

#### Limits- they open the topic to all drone warfare rather than targeted killing

## CP 1

#### Text: The President of the United States should issue a National Security Directive requiring the Department of Defense include in its Quadrennial Defense Review a recommendation to require that the President of the United States acquire the approval of the Pakistani government for remotely piloted aircraft targeting entities within Pakistan. The President should not de-classify information regarding this National Security Directive.

#### QDR solves- reduces war powers

Parsons, National Defense Magazine Staff Writer, 2013,

(Dan, "Analyst: 2014 Defense Review Offers Opportunity for Real Reform", National Defense Magazine, 6-17, PAS) [www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/lists/posts/post.aspx?ID=1182](http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/lists/posts/post.aspx?ID=1182) 9-2-13

Instead of shoehorning its current force structure within a confined budget, the U.S. military should decide what it wants to be able to accomplish in the future and then design an affordable force to achieve those goals, a new study on the upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review contends. ¶ ¶ “We have a very capable force today. But the QDR is supposed to look out into the future, 20 years in the future and detect trends in the threats, trends in technology and where we should put our resources to be prepared for those future threats.,” Mark Gunzinger, author of “Shaping America’s Military: Toward a New Force Planning Construct, said June 13 during a presentation of the report. ¶ ¶ “We need to decide what capabilities we need for the future, before we decide what cuts we’re going to make today,” added Gunzinger, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, the Washington, D.C.-based think tank that published the report. ¶ ¶ Gunzinger’s concern is that the QDR that is scheduled to be published in 2014 will simply cut the current military down to a size that is affordable based on the current constrained fiscal environment. Mandated by law, next year’s QDR is the first in 11 years that will be drafted without a seemingly endless pot of money to fund its objectives. In fact, this and the next QDR fall squarely into a timeframe when Pentagon officials can count on shrinking budgets.¶ ¶ “The QDR could become another budget-dominated drill, which could lead the U.S. military to cut force structure, personnel and programs resulting in a force structure that is a smaller version of what we have today — a force structure that is, frankly, best prepared for fading threats,” Gunzinger said. “You should invest in the future first, before you balance the budget.”¶

## CP 2

#### The Executive branch of the United States federal government should issue an executive order to establish a policy to require that the President of the United States acquire the approval of the Pakistani government for remotely piloted aircraft targeting entities within Pakistan. The order should also require consultation with the Office of Legal Counsel regarding drone strikes within Pakistan. The Executive Order should also require written publication of opinions in support of the legal framework.

#### Solves signal and is sustainable

Eric Posner and Vermeule 7, The University of Chicago Law School Professor, and Adrian Vermeule, Harvard Law School Professor of Law, 2007, The Credible Executive, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 865

The Madisonian system of oversight has not totally failed. Sometimes legislators overcome the temptation to free ride; sometimes they invest in protecting the separation of powers or legislative prerogatives. Sometimes judges review exercises of executive discretion, even during emergencies. But often enough, legislators and judges have no real alternative to letting executive officials exercise discretion unchecked. The Madisonian system is a partial failure; compensating mechanisms must be adopted to fill the area of slack, the institutional gap between executive discretion and the oversight capacities of other institutions. Again, the magnitude of this gap is unclear, but plausibly it is quite large; we will assume that it is. It is often assumed that this partial failure of the Madisonian system unshackles and therefore benefits ill-motivated executives. This is grievously incomplete. The failure of the Madisonian system harms the well-motivated executive as much as it benefits the ill-motivated one. Where Madisonian oversight fails, the well-motivated executive is a victim of his own power. Voters, legislators, and judges will be wary of granting further discretion to an executive whose motivations are uncertain and possibly nefarious. The partial failure of Madisonian oversight thus threatens a form of inefficiency, a kind of contracting failure that makes potentially everyone, including the voters, worse off. Our central question, then, is what the well-motivated executive can do to solve or at least ameliorate the problem. The solution is for the executive to complement his (well-motivated) first-order policy goals with second-order mechanisms for demonstrating credibility to other actors. We thus do not address the different question of what voters, legislators, judges, and other actors should do about an executive who is ill motivated and known to be so. That project involves shoring up or replacing the Madisonian system to block executive dictatorship. Our project is the converse of this, and involves finding new mechanisms to help the well-motivated executive credibly distinguish himself as such. IV. Executive Signaling: Law and Mechanisms We suggest that the executive's credibility problem can be solved by second-order mechanisms of executive signaling. In the general case, well-motivated executives send credible signals by taking actions that are more costly for ill-motivated actors than for well-motivated ones, thus distinguishing themselves from their ill-motivated mimics. Among the specific mechanisms we discuss, an important subset involves executive self-binding, whereby executives commit themselves to a course of action that would impose higher costs on ill-motivated actors. Commitments themselves have value as signals of benign motivations. This departs from the usual approach in legal scholarship. Legal theory has often discussed self-binding by "government" or government officials. In constitutional theory, it is often suggested that constitutions represent an attempt by "the people" to bind "themselves" against their own future decisionmaking pathologies, or relatedly, that constitutional prohibitions represent mechanisms by which governments commit themselves not to expropriate investments or to exploit their populations. n72 Whether or not this picture is coherent, n73 it is not the question we examine here, although some of the relevant considerations are similar. n74 We are not concerned with binding the president so that he cannot abuse his powers, but with how he might bind himself or take other actions that enhance his credibility, so that he can generate support from the public and other members of the government. [\*895] Furthermore, our question is subconstitutional: it is whether a well-motivated executive, acting within an established set of constitutional and statutory rules, can use signaling mechanisms to generate public trust. Accordingly, we proceed by assuming that no constitutional amendments or new statutes will be enacted. Within these constraints, what can a well-motivated executive do to bootstrap himself to credibility? The problem for the well-motivated executive is to credibly signal his benign motivations. In general, the solution is to engage in actions that are less costly for good types than for bad types. We begin with some relevant law, then examine a set of possible mechanisms -emphasizing both the conditions under which they might succeed and the conditions under which they might not -and conclude by examining the costs of credibility. A. A Preliminary Note on Law and Self-Binding Many of our mechanisms are unproblematic from a legal perspective, as they involve presidential actions that are clearly lawful. But a few raise legal questions; in particular, those that involve self-binding. n75 Can a president bind himself to respect particular first-order policies? With qualifications, the answer is yes, at least to the same extent that a legislature can. Formally, a duly promulgated executive rule or order binds even the executive unless and until it is validly abrogated, thereby establishing a new legal status quo. n76 The legal authority to establish a new status quo allows a president to create inertia or political constraints that will affect his own future choices. In a practical sense, presidents, like legislatures, have great de facto power to adopt policies that shape the legal landscape for the future. A president might commit himself to a long-term project of defense procurement or infrastructure or foreign policy, narrowing his own future choices and generating new political coalitions that will act to defend the new rules or policies. More schematically, we may speak of formal and informal means of self-binding: 1. The president might use formal means to bind himself. This is possible in the sense that an executive order, if otherwise valid, legally binds the president while it is in effect and may be enforced by the courts. It is not possible in the sense that the president can always repeal the executive order if he can bear the political and reputational costs of doing so. 2. The president might use informal means to bind himself. This is not only possible but frequent and important. Issuing an executive rule providing for the appointment of special prosecutors, as Nixon did, is not a formal self-binding. n77 However, there may be large political costs to repealing the order. This effect does not depend on the courts' willingness to enforce the order, even against Nixon himself. Court enforcement makes the order legally binding while it is in place, but only political and reputational enforcement can protect it from repeal. Just as a dessert addict might announce to his friends that he is going on a no-dessert diet in order to raise the reputational costs of backsliding and thus commit himself, so, too, the executive's issuance of a self-binding order can trigger reputational costs. In such cases, repeal of an executive order may be seen as a breach of faith even if no other institution ever enforces it.

#### OLC opinions bind executive action and are perceived internationally

Harris 5 (George C., Professor of Law – University of the Pacific McGeorge School of Law, “The Professional Responsibilities of Executive Branch Lawyers in the Wake of 9/11,” Journal of National Security Law & Policy, 1 J. Nat'l Security L. & Pol'y 409, Lexis)

C. The Role of Government Lawyers in Formulating the Unlawful Enemy Combatant Doctrine¶ In the months following 9/11, the OLC responded to requests from the White House and the Department of Defense for interpretation of domestic and international law bearing on the detention and treatment of terrorism suspects. OLC lawyers surely understood not only the urgency and significance of those requests, but also the profound implications of the issues **raised for international relations** and the rule of law itself.¶ [\*428] If those lawyers consulted the professional canons at this historic moment, they found, as demonstrated above, somewhat varied and equivocal guidance. Even approaching their responsibilities in the narrowest possible way, however, as parallel to the duties of a private lawyer asked by an organizational client for guidance regarding the limits of legal conduct, certain guiding principles should have been uncontroversial.¶ As expressed in Model Rules 1.2 and 2.1, they were obligated: (1) to provide advice, not advocacy - an honest and objective assessment of the actual legal and other consequences likely to result from any proposed courses of conduct, including the risks associated with those courses of conduct; (2) not to confine themselves to technical legal advice, if broader moral and ethical considerations were relevant; and (3) not to counsel any criminal conduct or recommend any means by which a crime might be committed with impunity. Whether or not those lawyers had broader, constitutional duties in light of their high office and oath, as a simple matter of competence and diligence n89 they were obligated to consider: (1) relevant executive branch as well as judicial precedent, including any history of prior executive branch opinions on related topics; and (2) likely responses to any proposed course of conduct by other government officials or parties that would be of consequence to the client.¶ The OLC lawyers who authored the Opinion Memos were not, however, merely lawyers for a private organizational client. The Assistant Attorney General in charge of the OLC was himself a high government official, appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. He and all of his deputies had taken oaths to uphold the Constitution and laws of the United States. n90 In preparing opinion memos for the President and other executive branch officials, they were exercising authority, given to the Attorney General by Congress in the Judiciary Act of 1789 and delegated by the Attorney General to the OLC, to determine the legal boundaries of executive power and discretion under the Constitution and laws. They knew that their opinions would likely guide the conduct of the President and bind the rest of the executive branch.¶ As noted above, commentators with OLC experience have differed regarding if and when the OLC's role should be quasi-judicial rather than client-centered. Unlike many of the opinion requests routinely discharged by the OLC that are subject to immediate judicial testing through the adversary [\*429] process - such as, for example, the constitutionality and effect of proposed legislation or the soundness of the government's proposed litigation posture-OLC lawyers understood that the requests addressed by the post-9/11 Opinion Memos had immediate implications for executive action that would be reviewed, if ever, only after the implementation of executive policies with potentially **far-reaching** impact on domestic and international affairs. Indeed, the Opinion Memos opined that the President's determination of some of these matters would never be subject to judicial review. n91¶ In this context, the quasi-judicial model championed by former OLC chief Randolph Moss a year before the 9/11 attacks n92 seems particularly appropriate. Guardianship of the rule of law itself lay conspicuously in the OLC's in-box. Advising the President on whether he could unilaterally suspend or disregard treaty obligations or customary international law would be reckless on anything but the "best view" of the law arrived at after full consideration of relevant executive branch as well as judicial precedent.

## DA 1

#### Presidential war powers high

Posner 13 President Ruthless, Eric Posner, professor at the University of Chicago Law School, May 23, 2013, http://www.slate.com/articles/news\_and\_politics/view\_from\_chicago/2013/05/obama\_s\_speech\_he\_s\_just\_like\_bush\_in\_pushing\_the\_limits\_of\_executive\_power.html

In his speech today about the future of American counterterrorism operations, President Obama said that he will order drone strikes less frequently and redouble efforts to transfer some detainees out of Guantánamo. He suggested a more focused approach to terrorist threats in light of the diminished capacity of al-Qaida. Yet he also maintained the administration’s long-standing legal approach. The speech thus may well confirm the view among Obama’s civil libertarian critics that he is the most lawless executive since, um, George Bush. They are right to see the continuity from one president to the next, but they are wrong to believe that Obama has violated the law.

#### Congressional restrictions undermine the executive- tanks heg

Yoo 6 Yoo, John, an American attorney, law professor, and author. He served as a political appointee, the Deputy Assistant U.S. Attorney General in the Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice (OLC), during the George W. Bush administration, "Exercising wartime powers: the need for a strong executive." Harvard International Review 28.1 (2006): 22+. Opposing Viewpoints In Context.

The Iraq is beginning to look like a rerun of the Vietnam War, and not just because critics are crying out that the United States has again fallen into a quagmire. War opponents argue that a wartime president has overstepped his constitutional bounds and that if Congress' constitutional role in deciding on war had been respected, the United States could have avoided trouble or at least have entered the war with broader popular support. According to Democratic Senator Edward Kennedy, the White House is improperly "abusing power, is excusing and authorizing torture, and is spying on American citizens." The terrorists would never have been harshly interrogated and intelligence surveillance never domestically expanded if only President George W. Bush had looked to Congress.¶ These war critics misread the Constitution's allocation of warmaking powers between the executive and legislative branches. Their interpretation is weakest where their case should be its strongest: who gets to decide whether to start a war. For much of the history of the nation, presidents and congresses have understood that the executive branch's constitutional authority includes the power to begin military hostilities abroad.¶ Energy in the Executive¶ During the last two centuries, neither the president nor Congress has ever acted under the belief that the Constitution requires a declaration of war before engaging in military hostilities abroad. Although the United States has used force abroad more than 100 times, it has declared war only five times: the War of 1812, the Mexican-American and Spanish-American wars, and World War I and II. Without declarations of war or any other congressional authorization, presidents have sent troops to oppose the Russian Revolution, intervene in Mexico, fight Chinese Communists in Korea, remove Manuel Noriega from power in Panama, and prevent human rights disasters in the Balkans. Other conflicts, such as both Persian Gulf Wars, received "authorization" from Congress but not declarations of war.¶ Critics of these conflicts want to upend long practice by appealing to an "original understanding" of the Constitution. But the text and structure of the Constitution, as well as its application over the last two centuries, confirm that the president can begin military hostilities without the approval of Congress. The Constitution does not establish a strict warmaking process because the Framers understood that war would require the speed, decisiveness, and secrecy that only the presidency could bring. "Energy in the executive," Alexander Hamilton argued in the Federalist Papers, "... is essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks." He continued, "the direction of war most peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand."¶ Rather than imposing a fixed, step-by-step method for going to war, the Constitution allows the executive and legislative branches substantial flexibility in shaping the decision-making process for engaging in military hostilities. Given the increasing ability of rogue states to procure weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and the rise of international terrorism, maintaining this flexibility is critical to preserving US national security.

#### Heg solves extinction

Brooks et al 13 Lean Forward: In Defense of American Engagement, Foreign Affairs, January 2013, Stephen G. Brooks, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth, G. John Ikenberry, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, and William C. Wohlforth, Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth, <http://mcfr.wildapricot.org/Resources/Documents/2013-05> 20%20Brooks%20Ikenberry%20FA%20Stay%20Engaged%201301.pdf

Since the end of World War II, the United States has pursued a single grand strategy: deep engagement. In an effort to protect its security and prosperity, the country has promoted a liberal economic order and established close defense ties with partners in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East. Its military bases cover the map, its ships patrol transit routes across the globe, and tens of thousands of its troops stand guard in allied countries such as Germany, Japan, and South Korea.¶ The details of U.S. foreign policy have differed from administration to administration, including the emphasis placed on democracy promotion and humanitarian goals, but for over 60 years, every president has agreed on the fundamental decision to remain deeply engaged in the world, even as the rationale for that strategy has shifted. During the Cold War, the United States' security commitments to Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East served primarily to prevent Soviet encroachment into the world's wealthiest and most resource-rich regions. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the aim has become to make these same regions more secure, and thus less threatening to the United States, and to use these security partnerships to foster the cooperation necessary for a stable and open international order.¶ Now, more than ever, Washington might be tempted to abandon this grand strategy and pull back from the world. The rise of China is chipping away at the United States' preponderance of power, a budget crisis has put defense spending on the chopping block, and two long wars have left the U.S. military and public exhausted. Indeed, even as most politicians continue to assert their commitment to global leadership, a very different view has taken hold among scholars of international relations over the past decade: that the United States should minimize its overseas military presence, shed its security ties, and give up its efforts to lead the liberal international order.¶ Proponents of retrenchment argue that a globally engaged grand strategy wastes money by subsidizing the defense of well-off allies and generates resentment among foreign populations and governments. A more modest posture, they contend, would put an end to allies' free-riding and defuse anti-American sentiment. Even if allies did not take over every mission the United States now performs, most of these roles have nothing to do with U.S. security and only risk entrapping the United States in unnecessary wars. In short, those in this camp maintain that pulling back would not only save blood and treasure but also make the United States more secure.¶ If Washington got out of East Asia, Japan and South Korea would likely expand their military capabilities and go nuclear.¶ They are wrong. In making their case, advocates of retrenchment overstate the costs of the current grand strategy and understate its benefits. In fact, the budgetary savings of lowering the United States' international profile are debatable, and there is little evidence to suggest that an internationally engaged America provokes other countries to balance against it, becomes overextended, or gets dragged into unnecessary wars.¶ The benefits of deep engagement, on the other hand, are legion. U.S. security commitments reduce competition in key regions and act as a check against potential rivals. They help maintain an open world economy and give Washington leverage in economic negotiations. And they make it easier for the United States to secure cooperation for combating a wide range of global threats. Were the United States to cede its global leadership role, it would forgo these proven upsides while exposing itself to the unprecedented downsides of a world in which the country was less secure, prosperous, and influential.¶ AN AFFORDABLE STRATEGY¶ Many advocates of retrenchment consider the United States' assertive global posture simply too expensive. The international relations scholar Christopher Layne, for example, has warned of the country's "ballooning budget deficits" and argued that "its strategic commitments exceed the resources available to support them." Calculating the savings of switching grand strategies, however, is not so simple, because it depends on the expenditures the current strategy demands and the amount required for its replacement -- numbers that are hard to pin down.¶ If the United States revoked all its security guarantees, brought home all its troops, shrank every branch of the military, and slashed its nuclear arsenal, it would save around $900 billion over ten years, according to Benjamin Friedman and Justin Logan of the Cato Institute. But few advocates of retrenchment endorse such a radical reduction; instead, most call for "restraint," an "offshore balancing" strategy, or an "over the horizon" military posture. The savings these approaches would yield are less clear, since they depend on which security commitments Washington would abandon outright and how much it would cost to keep the remaining ones. If retrenchment simply meant shipping foreign-based U.S. forces back to the United States, then the savings would be modest at best, since the countries hosting U.S. forces usually cover a large portion of the basing costs. And if it meant maintaining a major expeditionary capacity, then any savings would again be small, since the Pentagon would still have to pay for the expensive weaponry and equipment required for projecting power abroad.¶ The other side of the cost equation, the price of continued engagement, is also in flux. Although the fat defense budgets of the past decade make an easy target for advocates of retrenchment, such high levels of spending aren't needed to maintain an engaged global posture. Spending skyrocketed after 9/11, but it has already begun to fall back to earth as the United States winds down its two costly wars and trims its base level of nonwar spending. As of the fall of 2012, the Defense Department was planning for cuts of just under $500 billion over the next five years, which it maintains will not compromise national security. These reductions would lower military¶ spending to a little less than three percent of GDP by 2017, from its current level of 4.5 percent. The Pentagon could save even more with no ill effects by reforming its procurement practices and compensation policies.¶ Even without major budget cuts, however, the country can afford the costs of its ambitious grand strategy. The significant increases in military spending proposed by Mitt Romney, the Republican candidate, during the 2012 presidential campaign would still have kept military spending below its current share of GDP, since spending on the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq would still have gone down and Romney's proposed nonwar spending levels would not have kept pace with economic growth. Small wonder, then, that the case for pulling back rests more on the nonmonetary costs that the current strategy supposedly incurs.¶ UNBALANCED¶ One such alleged cost of the current grand strategy is that, in the words of the political scientist Barry Posen, it "prompts states to balance against U.S. power however they can." Yet there is no evidence that countries have banded together in anti-American alliances or tried to match the United States' military capacity on their own -- or that they will do so in the future.¶ Indeed, it's hard to see how the current grand strategy could generate true counterbalancing. Unlike past hegemons, the United States is geographically isolated, which means that it is far less threatening to other major states and that it faces no contiguous great-power rivals that could step up to the task of balancing against it. Moreover, any competitor would have a hard time matching the U.S. military. Not only is the United States so far ahead militarily in both quantitative and qualitative terms, but its security guarantees also give it the leverage to prevent allies from giving military technology to potential U.S. rivals. Because the United States dominates the high-end defense industry, it can trade access to its defense market for allies' agreement not to transfer key military technologies to its competitors. The embargo that the United States has convinced the EU to maintain on military sales to China since 1989 is a case in point.¶ The country's globe-spanning posture is the devil we know, and a world with a disengaged America is the devil we don't know.¶ If U.S. global leadership were prompting balancing, then one would expect actual examples of pushback -- especially during the administration of George W. Bush, who pursued a foreign policy that seemed particularly unilateral. Yet since the Soviet Union collapsed, no major powers have tried to balance against the United States by seeking to match its military might or by assembling a formidable alliance; the prospect is simply too daunting. Instead, they have resorted to what scholars call "soft balancing," using international institutions and norms to constrain Washington. Setting aside the fact that soft balancing is a slippery concept and difficult to distinguish from everyday diplomatic competition, it is wrong to say that the practice only harms the United States. Arguably, as the global leader, the United States benefits from employing soft- balancing-style leverage more than any other country. After all, today's rules and institutions came about under its auspices and largely reflect its interests, and so they are in fact tailor-made for soft balancing by the United States itself. In 2011, for example, Washington coordinated¶ action with several Southeast Asian states to oppose Beijing's claims in the South China Sea by pointing to established international law and norms.¶ Another argument for retrenchment holds that the United States will fall prey to the same fate as past hegemons and accelerate its own decline. In order to keep its ambitious strategy in place, the logic goes, the country will have to divert resources away from more productive purposes -- infrastructure, education, scientific research, and so on -- that are necessary to keep its economy competitive. Allies, meanwhile, can get away with lower military expenditures and grow faster than they otherwise would.¶ The historical evidence for this phenomenon is thin; for the most part, past superpowers lost their leadership not because they pursued hegemony but because other major powers balanced against them -- a prospect that is not in the cards today. (If anything, leading states can use their position to stave off their decline.) A bigger problem with the warnings against "imperial overstretch" is that there is no reason to believe that the pursuit of global leadership saps economic growth. Instead, most studies by economists find no clear relationship between military expenditures and economic decline.¶ To be sure, if the United States were a dramatic outlier and spent around a quarter of its GDP on defense, as the Soviet Union did in its last decades, its growth and competitiveness would suffer. But in 2012, even as it fought a war in Afghanistan and conducted counterterrorism operations around the globe, Washington spent just 4.5 percent of GDP on defense -- a relatively small fraction, historically speaking. (From 1950 to 1990, that figure averaged 7.6 percent.) Recent economic difficulties might prompt Washington to reevaluate its defense budgets and international commitments, but that does not mean that those policies caused the downturn. And any money freed up from dropping global commitments would not necessarily be spent in ways that would help the U.S. economy.¶ Likewise, U.S. allies' economic growth rates have nothing to do with any security subsidies they receive from Washington. The contention that lower military expenditures facilitated the rise of Japan, West Germany, and other countries dependent on U.S. defense guarantees may have seemed plausible during the last bout of declinist anxiety, in the 1980s. But these states eventually stopped climbing up the global economic ranks as their per capita wealth approached U.S. levels -- just as standard models of economic growth would predict. Over the past 20 years, the United States has maintained its lead in per capita GDP over its European allies and Japan, even as those countries' defense efforts have fallen further behind. Their failure to modernize their militaries has only served to entrench the United States' dominance.¶ LED NOT INTO TEMPTATION¶ The costs of U.S. foreign policy that matter most, of course, are human lives, and critics of an expansive grand strategy worry that the United States might get dragged into unnecessary wars. Securing smaller allies, they argue, emboldens those states to take risks they would not otherwise accept, pulling the superpower sponsor into costly conflicts -- a classic moral hazard problem. Concerned about the reputational costs of failing to honor the country's alliance commitments, U.S. leaders might go to war even when no national interests are at stake.¶ History shows, however, that great powers anticipate the danger of entrapment and structure their agreements to protect themselves from it. It is nearly impossible to find a clear case of a smaller power luring a reluctant great power into war. For decades, World War I served as the canonical example of entangling alliances supposedly drawing great powers into a fight, but an outpouring of new historical research has overturned the conventional wisdom, revealing that the war was more the result of a conscious decision on Germany's part to try to dominate Europe than a case of alliance entrapment.¶ If anything, alliances reduce the risk of getting pulled into a conflict. In East Asia, the regional security agreements that Washington struck after World War II were designed, in the words of the political scientist Victor Cha, to "constrain anticommunist allies in the region that might engage in aggressive behavior against adversaries that could entrap the United States in an unwanted larger war." The same logic is now at play in the U.S.-Taiwanese relationship. After cross-strait tensions flared in the 1990s and the first decade of this century, U.S. officials grew concerned that their ambiguous support for Taiwan might expose them to the risk of entrapment. So the Bush administration adjusted its policy, clarifying that its goal was to not only deter China from an unprovoked attack but also deter Taiwan from unilateral moves toward independence.¶ For many advocates of retrenchment, the problem is that the mere possession of globe-girdling military capabilities supposedly inflates policymakers' conception of the national interest, so much so that every foreign problem begins to look like America's to solve. Critics also argue that the country's military superiority causes it to seek total solutions to security problems, as in Afghanistan and Iraq, that could be dealt with in less costly ways. Only a country that possessed such awesome military power and faced no serious geopolitical rival would fail to be satisfied with partial fixes, such as containment, and instead embark on wild schemes of democracy building, the argument goes.¶ Furthermore, they contend, the United States' outsized military creates a sense of obligation to do something with it even when no U.S. interests are at stake. As Madeleine Albright, then the U.S. ambassador to the un, famously asked Colin Powell, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, when debating intervention in Bosnia in 1993, "What's the point of having this superb military you're always talking about if we can't use it?"¶ If the U.S. military scrapped its forces and shuttered its bases, then the country would no doubt eliminate the risk of entering needless wars, having tied itself to the mast like Ulysses. But if it instead merely moved its forces over the horizon, as is more commonly proposed by advocates of retrenchment, whatever temptations there were to intervene would not disappear. The bigger problem with the idea that a forward posture distorts conceptions of the national interest, however, is that it rests on just one case: Iraq. That war is an outlier in terms of both its high costs (it accounts for some two-thirds of the casualties and budget costs of all U.S. wars since 1990) and the degree to which the United States shouldered them alone. In the Persian Gulf War and the interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Libya, U.S. allies bore more of the burden, controlling for the size of their economies and populations.¶ Besides, the Iraq war was not an inevitable consequence of pursuing the United States' existing grand strategy; many scholars and policymakers who prefer an engaged America strongly¶ opposed the war. Likewise, continuing the current grand strategy in no way condemns the United States to more wars like it. Consider how the country, after it lost in Vietnam, waged the rest of the Cold War with proxies and highly limited interventions. Iraq has generated a similar reluctance to undertake large expeditionary operations -- what the political scientist John Mueller has dubbed "the Iraq syndrome." Those contending that the United States' grand strategy ineluctably leads the country into temptation need to present much more evidence before their case can be convincing.¶ KEEPING THE PEACE¶ Of course, even if it is true that the costs of deep engagement fall far below what advocates of retrenchment claim, they would not be worth bearing unless they yielded greater benefits. In fact, they do. The most obvious benefit of the current strategy is that it reduces the risk of a dangerous conflict. The United States' security commitments deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and dissuade U.S. partners from trying to solve security problems on their own in ways that would end up threatening other states.¶ Skeptics discount this benefit by arguing that U.S. security guarantees aren't necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries from erupting. They maintain that the high costs of territorial conquest and the many tools countries can use to signal their benign intentions are enough to prevent conflict. In other words, major powers could peacefully manage regional multipolarity without the American pacifier.¶ But that outlook is too sanguine. If Washington got out of East Asia, Japan and South Korea would likely expand their military capabilities and go nuclear, which could provoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It's worth noting that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan tried to obtain nuclear weapons; the only thing that stopped them was the United States, which used its security commitments to restrain their nuclear temptations. Similarly, were the United States to leave the Middle East, the countries currently backed by Washington -- notably, Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia -- might act in ways that would intensify the region's security dilemmas.¶ There would even be reason to worry about Europe. Although it's hard to imagine the return of great-power military competition in a post-American Europe, it's not difficult to foresee governments there refusing to pay the budgetary costs of higher military outlays and the political costs of increasing EU defense cooperation. The result might be a continent incapable of securing itself from threats on its periphery, unable to join foreign interventions on which U.S. leaders might want European help, and vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers.¶ Given how easily a U.S. withdrawal from key regions could lead to dangerous competition, advocates of retrenchment tend to put forth another argument: that such rivalries wouldn't actually hurt the United States. To be sure, few doubt that the United States could survive the return of conflict among powers in Asia or the Middle East -- but at what cost? Were states in one or both of these regions to start competing against one another, they would likely boost their military budgets, arm client states, and perhaps even start regional proxy wars, all of which should concern the United States, in part because its lead in military capabilities would narrow.¶ Greater regional insecurity could also produce cascades of nuclear proliferation as powers such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan built nuclear forces of their own. Those countries' regional competitors might then also seek nuclear arsenals. Although nuclear deterrence can promote stability between two states with the kinds of nuclear forces that the Soviet Union and the United States possessed, things get shakier when there are multiple nuclear rivals with less robust arsenals. As the number of nuclear powers increases, the probability of illicit transfers, irrational decisions, accidents, and unforeseen crises goes up.¶ The case for abandoning the United States' global role misses the underlying security logic of the current approach. By reassuring allies and actively managing regional relations, Washington dampens competition in the world's key areas, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse in which countries would grow new military capabilities. For proof that this strategy is working, one need look no further than the defense budgets of the current great powers: on average, since 1991 they have kept their military expenditures as a percentage of GDP to historic lows, and they have not attempted to match the United States' top-end military capabilities. Moreover, all of the world's most modern militaries are U.S. allies, and the United States' military lead over its potential rivals is by many measures growing.¶ On top of all this, the current grand strategy acts as a hedge against the emergence regional hegemons. Some supporters of retrenchment argue that the U.S. military should keep its forces over the horizon and pass the buck to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing rising regional powers. Washington, they contend, should deploy forces abroad only when a truly credible contender for regional hegemony arises, as in the cases of Germany and Japan during World War II and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Yet there is already a potential contender for regional hegemony -- China -- and to balance it, the United States will need to maintain its key alliances in Asia and the military capacity to intervene there. The implication is that the United States should get out of Afghanistan and Iraq, reduce its military presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia. Yet that is exactly what the Obama administration is doing.¶ MILITARY DOMINANCE, ECONOMIC PREEMINENCE¶ Preoccupied with security issues, critics of the current grand strategy miss one of its most important benefits: sustaining an open global economy and a favorable place for the United States within it. To be sure, the sheer size of its output would guarantee the United States a major role in the global economy whatever grand strategy it adopted. Yet the country's military dominance undergirds its economic leadership. In addition to protecting the world economy from instability, its military commitments and naval superiority help secure the sea-lanes and other shipping corridors that allow trade to flow freely and cheaply. Were the United States to pull back from the world, the task of securing the global commons would get much harder. Washington would have less leverage with which it could convince countries to cooperate on economic matters and less access to the military bases throughout the world needed to keep the seas open.¶ A global role also lets the United States structure the world economy in ways that serve its particular economic interests. During the Cold War, Washington used its overseas security commitments to get allies to embrace the economic policies it preferred -- convincing West¶ Germany in the 1960s, for example, to take costly steps to support the U.S. dollar as a reserve currency. U.S. defense agreements work the same way today. For example, when negotiating the 2011 free-trade agreement with South Korea, U.S. officials took advantage of Seoul's desire to use the agreement as a means of tightening its security relations with Washington. As one diplomat explained to us privately, "We asked for changes in labor and environment clauses, in auto clauses, and the Koreans took it all." Why? Because they feared a failed agreement would be "a setback to the political and security relationship."¶ More broadly, the United States wields its security leverage to shape the overall structure of the global economy. Much of what the United States wants from the economic order is more of the same: for instance, it likes the current structure of the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund and prefers that free trade continue. Washington wins when U.S. allies favor this status quo, and one reason they are inclined to support the existing system is because they value their military alliances. Japan, to name one example, has shown interest in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Obama administration's most important free-trade initiative in the region, less because its economic interests compel it to do so than because Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda believes that his support will strengthen Japan's security ties with the United States.¶ The United States' geopolitical dominance also helps keep the U.S. dollar in place as the world's reserve currency, which confers enormous benefits on the country, such as a greater ability to borrow money. This is perhaps clearest with Europe: the EU's dependence on the United States for its security precludes the EU from having the kind of political leverage to support the euro that the United States has with the dollar. As with other aspects of the global economy, the United States does not provide its leadership for free: it extracts disproportionate gains. Shirking that responsibility would place those benefits at risk.¶ CREATING COOPERATION¶ What goes for the global economy goes for other forms of international cooperation. Here, too, American leadership benefits many countries but disproportionately helps the United States. In order to counter transnational threats, such as terrorism, piracy, organized crime, climate change, and pandemics, states have to work together and take collective action. But cooperation does not come about effortlessly, especially when national interests diverge. The United States' military efforts to promote stability and its broader leadership make it easier for Washington to launch joint initiatives and shape them in ways that reflect U.S. interests. After all, cooperation is hard to come by in regions where chaos reigns, and it flourishes where leaders can anticipate lasting stability.¶ U.S. alliances are about security first, but they also provide the political framework and channels of communication for cooperation on nonmilitary issues. NATO, for example, has spawned new institutions, such as the Atlantic Council, a think tank, that make it easier for Americans and Europeans to talk to one another and do business. Likewise, consultations with allies in East Asia spill over into other policy issues; for example, when American diplomats travel to Seoul to manage the military alliance, they also end up discussing the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Thanks¶ to conduits such as this, the United States can use bargaining chips in one issue area to make progress in others.¶ The benefits of these communication channels are especially pronounced when it comes to fighting the kinds of threats that require new forms of cooperation, such as terrorism and pandemics. With its alliance system in place, the United States is in a stronger position than it would otherwise be to advance cooperation and share burdens. For example, the intelligence- sharing network within NATO, which was originally designed to gather information on the Soviet Union, has been adapted to deal with terrorism. Similarly, after a tsunami in the Indian Ocean devastated surrounding countries in 2004, Washington had a much easier time orchestrating a fast humanitarian response with Australia, India, and Japan, since their militaries were already comfortable working with one another. The operation did wonders for the United States' image in the region.¶ The United States' global role also has the more direct effect of facilitating the bargains among governments that get cooperation going in the first place. As the scholar Joseph Nye has written, "The American military role in deterring threats to allies, or of assuring access to a crucial resource such as oil in the Persian Gulf, means that the provision of protective force can be used in bargaining situations. Sometimes the linkage may be direct; more often it is a factor not mentioned openly but present in the back of statesmen's minds."¶ THE DEVIL WE KNOW¶ Should America come home? For many prominent scholars of international relations, the answer is yes -- a view that seems even wiser in the wake of the disaster in Iraq and the Great Recession. Yet their arguments simply don't hold up. There is little evidence that the United States would save much money switching to a smaller global posture. Nor is the current strategy self- defeating: it has not provoked the formation of counterbalancing coalitions or caused the country to spend itself into economic decline. Nor will it condemn the United States to foolhardy wars in the future. What the strategy does do is help prevent the outbreak of conflict in the world's most important regions, keep the global economy humming, and make international cooperation easier. Charting a different course would threaten all these benefits.¶ This is not to say that the United States' current foreign policy can't be adapted to new circumstances and challenges. Washington does not need to retain every commitment at all costs, and there is nothing wrong with rejiggering its strategy in response to new opportunities or setbacks. That is what the Nixon administration did by winding down the Vietnam War and increasing the United States' reliance on regional partners to contain Soviet power, and it is what the Obama administration has been doing after the Iraq war by pivoting to Asia. These episodes of rebalancing belie the argument that a powerful and internationally engaged America cannot tailor its policies to a changing world.¶ A grand strategy of actively managing global security and promoting the liberal economic order has served the United States exceptionally well for the past six decades, and there is no reason to give it up now. The country's globe-spanning posture is the devil we know, and a world with a disengaged America is the devil we don't know. Were American leaders to choose retrenchment,¶ they would in essence be running a massive experiment to test how the world would work without an engaged and liberal leading power. The results could well be disastrous.

## DA 2

#### Budget agreement will pass---PC is key

Calmes & Parker 10/10 Jackie Calmes and Ashley Parker are NYT Staff Reporters, “No Quick Deal, but Offer by G.O.P. on Debt Shifts the Tone,” 10-10-13, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/11/us/politics/debt-limit-debate.html?_r=0>, DOA: 10-10-13, y2k

In statements afterward that struck the most positive tone in weeks of acrimony, House Republicans described their hour-and-a-half-long meeting with Mr. Obama as “a useful and productive conversation,” while the White House described “a good meeting,” though “no specific determination was made” about the Republicans’ offer. Both agreed to continue talks through the night. People familiar with the meeting said that Mr. Obama pressed Republicans to reopen the government, and that Republicans raised the possibility that financing could be restored by early next week if terms for broad budget negotiations could be reached. Twenty Republicans, led by Speaker John A. Boehner, went to the White House at Mr. Obama’s invitation after a day of fine-tuning their proposal to increase the Treasury Department’s authority to borrow money to pay existing obligations through Nov. 22. The government is expected to reach its borrowing limit next week. In exchange, they sought a commitment by the president to negotiate a deal for long-term deficit reduction and a tax overhaul. The president “didn’t say yes, didn’t say no,” said Representative Paul D. Ryan, Republican of Wisconsin and chairman of the House Budget Committee. He added, “We agreed to continue talking and continue negotiating.” An initial report that Mr. Obama had rejected the Republicans’ offer was too definitive and came before Republican leaders or the White House had made it clear to reporters that the negotiations would continue. Still, the House Republican offer represented a potentially significant breakthrough. Even if Democrats found fault with the Republicans’ immediate proposal — for example, it would prevent a Treasury secretary from engaging in accounting maneuvers to stave off potential default — it was seen as an opening gambit in the legislative dance toward some resolution before the government is expected to breach its debt limit on Thursday. Even before the meeting, the White House and its Democratic allies in Congress were all but declaring victory at the evidence that Republicans — suffering the most in polls, and pressured by business allies and donors not to provoke a government default — were seeking a way out of the impasse. After some fretful weeks, the Democrats believe, Mr. Obama was seeing some payoff for his big gamble this year. Burned by his experience with House Republicans in mid-2011, when brinkmanship over the debt limit hobbled the already weak economy, Mr. Obama began his second term vowing never again to negotiate over raising the ceiling or to give any concessions to Republicans for performing an act that is their constitutional responsibility. “The good news is that Republicans have accepted the principle that they’re not going to attach conditions to the debt ceiling,” said Representative Chris Van Hollen of Maryland, the senior Democrat on the House Budget Committee. “The bad news is they’ve only extended the debt ceiling for six weeks, which will continue to generate huge amounts of destructive uncertainty in the economy. And, of course, they also continue to keep the government shut down.” For House Republicans, the maneuvers represented a near complete reversal of their original strategy in September of going to the mat over the debt limit but not shutting down the government. Now, under pressure from falling poll numbers and angry business supporters, they are seeking a compromise on the debt ceiling. Yet for now, they are still refusing to finance and reopen the government without some concessions. Mr. Boehner and his colleagues left the White House without speaking to waiting reporters, and quickly gathered in his Capitol suite for further discussion. Their debt limit proposal could come to a vote as soon as Friday. Before the White House meeting, administration and Congressional Democrats said they were skeptical that House Republican leaders could pass the proposal. A large faction of Tea Party conservatives campaigned on promises never to vote to increase the nation’s debt limit, and they say they do not believe the warnings that failing to act could provoke a default and economic chaos globally. And Congressional Democrats vowed to oppose any proposal that did not also fully finance a government now shuttered since the fiscal year began Oct. 1. “We’ll see what they’re able to pass,” said Mr. Obama’s press secretary, Jay Carney. Senate Democrats had their own White House meeting with Mr. Obama and Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. three hours before the House Republicans arrived, and the majority leader, Senator Harry Reid of Nevada, declined to embrace the Republicans’ debt limit proposal until he saw it. He told reporters that Democrats would not negotiate on further deficit reductions until House Republicans agreed to the measure passed by the Senate to finance and open the government through mid-November. “Not going to happen,” Mr. Reid said. “Open the government,” he added. “There is so much pain and suffering out there. It is really tear-jerking, to say the least.” Mr. Ryan said before the White House meeting that Republicans were now willing to formally negotiate with Senate Democrats over a long-term, comprehensive budget framework. The Republicans have resisted such a move since April, fearing that it would require compromises, like raising additional tax revenues, that would enrage the party’s conservative base heading into the 2014 midterm elections. Many House Republicans, leaving a closed-door party caucus earlier Thursday that at times grew contentious, said they would support their leadership’s short-term debt limit proposal. But they said they would do so only if Mr. Obama agreed to negotiate a broader deficit reduction deal, with big savings from entitlement programs. But the president has insisted he will not agree to significant reductions in projected Medicare and Medicaid spending — even his own tentative proposals — unless Republicans agree to raise revenues by curbing tax breaks for corporations and wealthy individuals. And Mr. Boehner in recent days reaffirmed the party’s anti-tax stance, suggesting future talks could founder on the same tax-and-entitlement spending divide that caused past negotiations to collapse. Economists across a broad spectrum agree that breaching the debt limit would damage the economy and could be calamitous if it is prolonged. The new Republican proposal could temporarily remove that threat.

#### Restrict war powers guts PC

Lillis and Wasson 9/7 Fears of wounding Obama weigh heavily on Democrats ahead of vote, Fears of wounding Obama weigh heavily on Democrats ahead of vote, Mike Lillis and Erik Wasson, 09/07/13, http://thehill.com/homenews/house/320829-fears-of-wounding-obama-weigh-heavily-on-democrats

The prospect of wounding President Obama is weighing heavily on Democratic lawmakers as they decide their votes on Syria.¶ Obama needs all the political capital he can muster heading into bruising battles with the GOP over fiscal spending and the debt ceiling.¶ Democrats want Obama to use his popularity to reverse automatic spending cuts already in effect and pay for new economic stimulus measures through higher taxes on the wealthy and on multinational companies.¶ But if the request for authorization for Syria military strikes is rebuffed, some fear it could limit Obama's power in those high-stakes fights. ¶ That has left Democrats with an agonizing decision: vote "no" on Syria and possibly encourage more chemical attacks while weakening their president, or vote "yes" and risk another war in the Middle East.¶ “I’m sure a lot of people are focused on the political ramifications,” a House Democratic aide said.¶ Rep. Jim Moran (D-Va.), a veteran appropriator, said the failure of the Syria resolution would diminish Obama's leverage in the fiscal battles.¶ "It doesn't help him," Moran said Friday by phone. "We need a maximally strong president to get us through this fiscal thicket. These are going to be very difficult votes."¶ “Clearly a loss is a loss,” a Senate Democratic aide noted.¶ Publicly, senior party members are seeking to put a firewall between a failed Syria vote — one that Democrats might have a hand in — and fiscal matters.¶ Rep. Gerry Connolly (D-Va.) said Friday that the fear of damaging Obama just eight months into his second term "probably is in the back of people's minds" heading into the Syria vote. But the issue has not percolated enough to influence the debate.¶ "So far it hasn't surfaced in people's thinking explicitly," Connolly told MSNBC. "People have pretty much been dealing with the merits of the case, not about the politics of it — on our side." ¶ Moran said he doesn't think the political aftershocks would be the “deciding factor” in their Syria votes.¶ "I rather doubt that most of my colleagues are looking at the bigger picture," he said, "and even if they were, I don't think it would be the deciding factor."¶ Moran said the odds of passing the measure in the House looked slim as of Friday. ¶ Other Democrats are arguing that the Syria vote should be viewed in isolation from other matters before Congress.¶ “I think it’s important each of these major issues be decided on its own — including this one,” Rep. Sander Levin (Mich.), senior Democrat on the House Ways and Means Committee, said Friday.¶ With Obama scheduled to address the country Tuesday night, several Democrats said the fate of the Syria vote could very well hinge on the president's ability to change public opinion.¶ “This is going to be a fireside chat, somewhat like it was in the Thirties," Levin said. "I wasn’t old enough to know, one has to remember how difficult it was for President Roosevelt in WWII."¶ Rep. Elijah Cummings (D-Md.), who remains undecided on the Syria question, agreed.¶ "It's very, very important that the case for involvement in Syria not only be made to the members of Congress and the Senate, but it must also be made to the American people," Cummings said Friday in the Capitol. ¶ Still other Democrats, meanwhile, are arguing that the ripple effects of a Syria vote are simply too complicated to game out in advance. Some said the GOP has shown little indication it will advance Obama’s agenda even after his reelection, so a Syria failure would do little damage. ¶ “There is a constant wounding [of Obama] going on with the Tea Party on budgets, appropriations and the debt ceiling,” said Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee (D-Texas). “I am going to reach out to my colleagues, Tea Party or not, and ask is this really the way you want to project the political process?” ¶ Jackson Lee said using Syria to score political points would be “frolicking and frivolity” by the Tea Party. ¶ Yet others see a more serious threat to the Democrats' legislative agenda if the Syria vote fails.¶ A Democratic leadership aide argued that Republicans — some of whom are already fundraising on their opposition to the proposed Syria strikes — would only be emboldened in their fight against Obama's agenda if Congress shoots down the use-of-force resolution.¶ "It's just going to make things harder to do in Congress, that's for sure," the aide said Friday.

#### Debt ceiling kills economy

Kurtzleben 10/2 How Each New Fiscal Crisis Makes the Economy a Little Shakier, DANIELLE KURTZLEBEN, business and economics reporter for U.S. News & World Report, October 2, 2013, http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/10/02/how-each-new-fiscal-crisis-makes-the-economy-a-little-shakier

That prospect is made exponentially more scary with a debt ceiling deadline fast-approaching as soon as Oct. 17.¶ "The problem this time is markets are used to people in Washington screaming, 'Oh my goodness, we're going off the cliff,'" says Justin Wolfers, professor of public policy and economics at the University of Michigan. "They've stopped paying attention to that. As a result we're not yet seeing financial markets substantially enough concerned about the debt ceiling. And that raises the possibility of Congress doing something reckless, because markets aren't giving them the wake-up call they've given them in the past."¶ [ALSO: Wall Street CEOs Meet at White House for Shutdown Talks]¶ "Reckless" action, like not raising the debt limit, could have effects that are, quite literally, unimaginable. The nation has never defaulted before, and if that should happen this time around, there's no telling exactly how it would play out. It could mean a spike in interest rates, making borrowing for businesses and homebuyers – not to mention the U.S. government – much harder, and potentially dragging the nation into recession. Even tiptoeing over the limit could shake confidence in the U.S. economy.¶ "Even if [lawmakers] decide they're going to raise the debt limit on the 18th or 19th or 20th of October, they will have done significant damage, and that will show up in the economic data," Zandi said.¶ Similarly, individual investors have remained calm in comparison with 2011.¶ "So far, the market reaction has been muted, especially when compared to the debt ceiling debate in 2011," says a Wednesday note from investment banking firm Keefe, Bruyette, & Woods.¶ In the weeks leading up to and following the 2011 debt ceiling debacle, the Dow fell by 14 percent. Stocks have slipped slightly in the past week, but it is uncertain how they will fare ahead of a debt limit crisis.¶ True, there are a few reasons why investors may be less shaky than in 2011. The U.S. and global economies alike have healed since then, and European debt crises in particular are not the threat they once were. In addition, rating agencies do not appear to be ready to downgrade the U.S. credit rating, as they were in 2011.¶ Still, whether the economy is in sorry shape or slowly recovering (as it is now), the possibility of hitting the debt ceiling could be disastrous. And analysts at Keefe, Bruyette, & Woods believe volatility in the stock market will pick up as Oct. 17 approaches.

#### Debt freeze shatters the U.S. and global economies and causes food price spikes

Min 10 (David, Associate Director for Financial Markets Policy – Center for American Progress, “The Big Freeze”, 10-28, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/10/big\_freeze.html)

A freeze on the debt ceiling could erode confidence in U.S. Treasury bonds in a number of ways, creating further and wider panic in financial markets. First, [by causing a disruption in the issuance of Treasury debt, as happened in 1995-96](http://www.gao.gov/archive/1996/ai96130.pdf), a freeze would cause investors to seek alternative financial investments, even perhaps causing a run on Treasurys. Such a run would cause the cost of U.S. debt to soar, putting even more stress on our budget, and the resulting enormous capital flows would likely be highly destabilizing to global financial markets, potentially creating more asset bubbles and busts throughout the world.¶ Second, the massive withdrawal of public spending that would occur would cause significant concern among institutional investors worldwide that the U.S. would swiftly enter a second, very deep, recession, raising concerns about the ability of the United States to repay its debt. Finally, the sheer recklessness of a debt freeze during these tenuous times would signal to already nervous investors that there was a significant amount of political risk, which could cause them to shy away from investing in the United States generally.¶ Taken together, these factors would almost certainly result in a significant increase in the interest rates we currently pay on our national debt, currently just above 2.5 percent for a 10-year Treasury note. If in the near term these rates moved even to 5.9 percent, the long-term rate predicted by the Congressional Budget Office, then our interest payments would increase by more than double, to nearly $600 billion a year. These rates could climb even higher, if investors began to price in a “default risk” into Treasurys—something that reckless actions by Congress could potentially spark—thus greatly exacerbating our budget problems.¶ The U.S. dollar, of course, is the world’s reserve currency in large part because of the depth and liquidity of the U.S. Treasury bond market. If this market is severely disrupted, and investors lost confidence in U.S. Treasurys, then it is unclear where nervous investors might go next. A sharp and swift move by investors out of U.S. Treasury bonds could be highly destabilizing, straining the already delicate global economy.¶ Imagine, for example, if investors moved from sovereign debt into commodities, most of which are priced and traded in dollars. This could have the catastrophic impact of weakening the world’s largest economies while also raising the prices of the basic inputs (such as metals or food) that are necessary for economic growth.¶ In short, a freeze on the debt ceiling would cause our interest payments to spike, making our budget situation even more problematic, while potentially triggering greater global instability—perhaps even a global economic depression.

**Food shortages cause extinction**

Julian Cribb 10 is a science communicator and author of The Coming Famine: the global food crisis and what we can do to avoid it. He is a member of On Line Opinion's Editorial Advisory Board. “The Coming Famine,” August 24, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/25/books/excerpt-the-coming-famine.html?pagewanted=all>, Accessed Date: 3-6-13 y2k

Despite the global food crisis of 2007–8, the coming famine hasn’t happened yet. It is a looming planetary emergency whose interlocked causes and deeper ramifications the world has barely begun to absorb, let alone come to grips with. Experts predict that the crisis will peak by the middle of the twenty-first century; it is arriving even faster than climate change. Yet there is still time to forestall catastrophe. The first foreshocks were discernible soon after the turn of the millennium. In the years from 2001 to 2008 the world steadily consumed more grain that it produced, triggering rising prices, growing shortages, and even rationing and famine in poorer countries. The global stockpile of grain shrank from more than a hundred days’ supply of food to less than fifty days’. It was the difference between a comfortable surplus and alarming shortages in some countries; it was accompanied by soaring prices — and the resulting fury of ordinary citizens. It was mainly this simple fact of each year consuming slightly more than we grew that panicked the long-quiescent grain markets, triggering a cycle of price increases that sent shockwaves through consumers in all countries, governments, and global institutions such as the United Nations, its FAO, and the World Bank. All of a sudden food security, having been off the po liti cal menu for de cades, was heading the bill of fare — not even to be entirely eclipsed by the spectacular crash of the world’s financial markets that followed soon afterward. That the world was suddenly short of food — after almost a half century of abundance, extravagant variety, year-round availability, and the cheapest real food prices enjoyed by many consumers in the whole of human history — seemed unimaginable. On tele vi sion celebrity chefs extolled the virtue of devouring animals and plants increasingly rare in the wild; magazines larded their pages with mouth-watering recipes to tempt their overfed readers’ jaded appetites; food corporations churned out novel concoctions of salt, sugar, fat, emulsifier, extender, and dye; fast-food outlets disgorged floods of dubious nutrition to fatten an already overweight 1.4 billion people. And, in the third world, nearly fifteen thousand children continued to die quietly and painfully each day from hunger-related disease. “A brutal convergence of events has hit an unprepared global market, and grain prices are sky high. The world’s poor suffer most,” stated the Washington Post. “The food price shock now roiling world markets is destabilizing governments, igniting street riots and threatening to send a new wave of hunger rippling through the world’s poorest nations. It is outpacing even the Soviet grain emergency of 1972–75, when world food prices rose 78 percent.” Between 2005 and 2008 food prices rose on average by 80 percent, according to the FAO. “Rocketing food prices — some of which have more than doubled in two years — have sparked riots in numerous countries recently,” Time magazine reported. “Millions are reeling . . . and governments are scrambling to staunch a fast-moving crisis before it spins out of control. From Mexico to Pakistan, protests have turned violent.” Time attributed events to booming demand from newly affluent Chinese and Indian consumers, freak weather events that had reduced harvests, the spike in oil prices, and growth in the production of farm biofuels. In early 2007, thousands of Mexicans turned out on the streets in protest over the “tortilla crisis” — savage increases in the cost of maize flour. Over the ensuing months food riots or public unrest over food prices were reported by media in Haiti, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Bangladesh, India, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Cameroon, Morocco, Mauritania, Somalia, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Kenya, Egypt, Ivory Coast, Yemen, the United Arab Emirates, Mexico, and Zimbabwe. In Haiti riots forced the resignation of the prime minister and obliged the United Nations World Food Programme to provide emergency aid to 2.3 million people. The new government of Nepal tottered. Mexico announced plans to freeze the prices of 150 staple foods. The U.K. Guardian reported riots in fifteen countries; the New York Times and the World Bank both said thirty. The FAO declared that thirty-seven countries faced food crises due to conflict or disaster at the start of 2008, adding that 1.5 billion people living in degraded lands were at risk of starvation. The Economist magazine succinctly labeled it a “silent tsunami.” The rhetoric reflected the sudden, adventitious nature of the crisis. “It is an apocalyptic warning,” pronounced Tim Costello, the Australian head of the aid agency World Vision. “Until recently we had plenty of food: the question was distribution. The truth is because of rising oil prices, global warming and the loss of arable land, all countries that can produce food now desperately need to produce more.” “What we are witnessing is not a natural disaster — a silent tsunami or a perfect storm. It is a man-made catastrophe,” the World Bank group president Robert Zoellick advised the G8 leaders feasting in Japan. Major rice-growing countries, including India, Vietnam, China, and Cambodia, imposed export restrictions to curb rice price inflation at home. Malaysia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and the Philippines began stockpiling grain while Pakistan and Rus sia raised wheat export taxes and Brazil, Indonesia, and Argentina imposed export restrictions. Guinea banned all food exports. The panic reached a peak in Asia, where rice prices soared by almost 150 percent in barely a year. “Nobody has ever seen such a jump in the price of rice,” said sixty-eight-year-old Kwanchai Gomez, the executive director of the Thai Rice Foundation. Filipino fast-food outlets voluntarily reduced customer portions by half. In Thailand, thieves secretly stripped rice paddies by night to make a fast profit. India banned the export of all non-basmati rice, and Vietnam embargoed rice exports, period, sending Thai rice prices spiraling upward by 30 percent. The giant U.S. retailer Wal-Mart rationed rice sales to customers of its Sam’s Club chain, as did some British retailers. Such mea sures did little to quell the panic, which was originally touched off by a 50 percent drop in surplus rice stocks over the previous seven years. The International Rice Research Institute attributed the crisis to loss of land to industrialization and city sprawl, the growing demand for meat in China and India, and floods or bad weather in Indonesia, Bangladesh, Vietnam, China, and Burma. By mid-2009, accelerated by the worldwide financial crash, thirtythree countries around the world were facing either “alarming” or “extremely alarming” food shortages, a billion people were eating less each day — and most of Earth’s citizens were feeling the pinch. Though food prices fell, alongside prices of stocks and most other commodities, in the subsequent months, they fell only a little — and then began to rise again. What happened in 2008 wasn’t the coming famine of the twenty-first century, merely a premonition of what lies ahead. This will not be a single event, affecting all nations and peoples equally at all times, but in one way or another it will leave no person in the world untouched. The reemergence of food scarcity occurs after de cades of plenty, accompanied by the lowest real food prices for consumers in history. These bounteous years were the consequence of a food production miracle achieved by the world’s farmers and agricultural scientists from the 1960s on — a miracle of which the urbanized world of today seems largely oblivious and which we have forgotten to renew. By the early twenty-first century, signs of complacency were in evidence. In 2003, a conference of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research in Nairobi was told, “According to the Food and Agriculture Or ga ni za tion of the United Nations, the number of foodinsecure people in developing countries fell from 920 million in 1980 to 799 million in 1999.” Even in the immediate aftermath of the 2008 food price spike, the FAO itself, along with the Or ga ni za tion for Economic Cooperation and Development, remarked, “the underlying forces that drive agricultural product supply (by and large productivity gains) will eventually outweigh the forces that determine stronger demand, both for food and feed as well as for industrial demand, most notably for biofuel production. Consequently, prices will resume their decline in real terms, though possibly not by quite as much as in the past.” For some years, reassuring statements such as these had been repeatedly aired in the food policy, overseas aid, and research worlds. Unintentionally, food scientists and policy makers were sending a signal to governments and aid donors around the world that implied, “Relax. It’s under control. We’ve fixed the problem. Food is no longer critical.” Not surprisingly, aid donors rechanneled scarce funds to other urgent priorities — and growth in crop yields sagged as the world’s foot came off the scientific accelerator. Many found the new crisis all the more mysterious for its apparent lack of an obvious trigger. Various culprits were pilloried by blameseeking politicians and media. Biofuels, after being talked up as one of the great hopes for combating climate change, quickly became a villain accused of “burning the food of the poor” and, from China to Britain, countries slammed the brakes on policies intended to encourage farmers to grow more “green fuel” from grain. According to the World Bank, biofuels could have caused as much as three-quarters of the hike in food prices. Equally to blame, according to other commentators, were oil prices, which had soared sixfold in the five years from mid-2003 to mid-2008 (although they fell again sharply as the global recession bit deep) with severe consequences for the cost of producing food, through their impact on farmer’s fuel, fertilizer, pesticide, and transportation costs. In developed countries the financial pain was high, but in developing nations it was agony: farmers simply could not afford to buy fertilizer and crop yields began to slip. In Thailand rice farmers quietly parked their new but unaffordable tractors in their sheds and went back to plowing with buffalo; buffalo breeders experienced a bonanza. “Energy and agricultural prices have become increasingly intertwined,” commented Joachim von Braun, the head of the International Food Policy Research Institute. “High energy prices have made agricultural production more expensive by raising the cost of cultivation, inputs — especially fertilizers and irrigation — and transportation of inputs and outputs. In poor countries, this hinders production response to high output prices. The main new link between energy and agricultural prices, however, is the competition of grain and oilseed land for feed and food, versus their use for bio energy.” Speculators, fleeing crumbling financial markets and discovering an unlikely haven in booming agricultural commodities, were a favorite target of media ire: “Food was becoming the new gold. Investors fleeing Wall Street’s mortgage-related strife plowed hundreds of millions of dollars into grain futures, driving prices up even more. By Christmas (2007), a global panic was building,” reported the Washington Post. In developing nations, traders and grain dealers were accused of buying up surplus stocks and hoarding them to drive the prices higher still. In the Philippines the government threatened hoarders with charges of economic sabotage and sent armed soldiers to supervise the distribution of subsidized grain. Retirement and hedge funds, casting about for something to invest in that wasn’t going to hell in a handbasket, also jumped on farm commodities and even agribusiness enterprises — areas such investors traditionally shun. Many saw the crisis as simply a result of the growth of human population, the inexorable climb from 3 billion people in 1960 to 6.8 billion by 2008 — the hundred million more mouths we have to feed in each succeeding year. Others ascribed it chiefly to burgeoning appetites in China and India, which had in a matter of five years or so together added the consumer equivalent of Eu rope to global demand for food as their emergent middle classes indulged in the delights of diets containing far more meat, poultry, dairy, and fish than ever before. In China, meat consumption trebled in less than fifteen years, requiring a tenfold increase in the grain needed to feed the animals and fish. One way to visualize the issue is that growth in global food production of 1–1.5 percent a year has more or less kept pace with growth in population — but has fallen short of meeting the growth in demand. One explanation for this is that farmers around the world have not responded by increasing the area of land they plant and harvest or raising their crop yields so rapidly as in the past. The big question is: why? Some blamed the weather. Portentously, many were quick to discern the looming shadow of climate change in the run of droughts, floods, and other natural mishaps that had disrupted global farm production across most continents in recent years. In eastern Australia a ten-year drought slashed grain production and all but obliterated the rice industry; the unpre ce dented draining of Australia’s food bowl, the Murray-Darling Basin, threatened to eliminate fruit, vegetable, and livestock industries reliant on irrigation. Similar hardship faced producers across sub-Sahelian Africa. Floods in China and along the Mississippi River wreaked local havoc with grain production. In Burma, Cyclone Nargis flattened the Irawaddy Delta rice crop, propelling Asian prices into a fresh spiral. Heat waves in California and torrential rains in India added to perceptions — heightened by media reportage — that the climate was running amok. Other commentators sought villains among the world’s governments, blaming protectionism and hidden trade barriers, farm subsidies, food price controls or taxes, environmental and health restrictions, the ensnaring of farmers in snarls of red tape, along with the perennial failure of trade negotiators to open up global trade in agricultural products. Supermarkets and globalization of the food trade came in for flak, especially from the po liti cal left and from farmers themselves, for driving down farm commodity prices and thus discouraging growers from increasing production. Economic observers read the crisis as primarily due to weaker growth in food production at a time of strong growth in consumer demand, especially in China and India and among affluent populations worldwide. The Green Revolution, whose technologies had delivered the last great surge in global food production in the 1970s and 1980s seemed to be fizzling out, a view supported by the disturbing slide in crop yield advances. Yields of the major crops of wheat, maize, and rice had once increased by as much as 5 and even 10 percent a year — now they were increasing by 1 percent or nothing at all. In the overheated economy of the early twenty-first century, farm costs had soared along with oil prices, hindering farmers from adopting newer, but costlier and more energyintensive, technologies. In advanced countries, some scientists whispered, we might actually be approaching the physical limits of the ability of plants to turn sunlight into edible food. In the general hunt for someone to blame for the short-term food crisis, a more profound truth was being obscured — that the challenge is far deeper, longer-term, and more intractable than most people, and certainly most governments, understand. It stems from the magnifying and interacting constraints on food production generated as civilization presses harder against the finite bounds of the planet’s natural resources, combined with human appetites that seem to know no bounds. This challenge is more pressing even than climate change. A climate crisis may emerge over de cades. A food crisis can explode within weeks — and kill within days. But the two are also interlocked. “If the world were to experience a year of bad weather similar to that experienced in 1972, the current ‘food crisis’ would pale in comparison to the crisis that would arise as a result. This should be taken as a warning that advance planning ought to be done if total chaos is to be avoided,” observes the resource analyst Bruce Sundquist. The character of human conflict has also changed: since the early 1990s, more wars have been triggered by disputes over food, land, and water than over mere political or ethnic differences. This should not surprise us: people have fought over the means of survival for most of history. But in the abbreviated reports on the nightly media, and even in the rarefied realms of government policy, the focus is almost invariably on the players — the warring national, ethnic, or religious factions — rather than on the play, the deeper subplots building the tensions that ignite conflict. Caught up in these are groups of ordinary, desperate people fearful that there is no longer sufficient food, land, and water to feed their children — and believing that they must fight “the others” to secure them. At the same time, the number of refugees in the world doubled, many of them escaping from conflicts and famines precipitated by food and resource shortages. Governments in troubled regions tottered and fell. The coming famine is planetary because it involves both the immediate effects of hunger on directly affected populations in heavily populated regions of the world in the next forty years — and also the impacts of war, government failure, refugee crises, shortages, and food price spikes that will affect all human beings, no matter who they are or where they live. It is an emergency because unless it is solved, billions will experience great hardship, and not only in the poorer regions. Mike Murphy, one of the world’s most progressive dairy farmers, with operations in Ireland, New Zealand, and North and South America, succinctly summed it all up: “Global warming gets all the publicity but the real imminent threat to the human race is starvation on a massive scale. Taking a 10–30 year view, I believe that food shortages, famine and huge social unrest are probably the greatest threat the human race has ever faced. I believe future food shortages are a far bigger world threat than global warming.” The coming famine is also complex, because it is driven not by one or two, or even a half dozen, factors but rather by the confluence of many large and profoundly intractable causes that tend to amplify one another. This means that it cannot easily be remedied by “silver bullets” in the form of technology, subsidies, or single-country policy changes, because of the synergetic character of the things that power it. To see where the answers may lie, we need to explore each of the main drivers. On the demand side the chief drivers are: Population. Although the rate of growth in human numbers is slowing, the present upward trend of 1.5 percent (one hundred million more people) per year points to a population of around 9.2 billion in 2050 — 3 billion more than in 2000. Most of this expansion will take place in poorer countries and in tropical/subtropical regions. In countries where birth rates are falling, governments are bribing their citizens with subsidies to have more babies in an effort to address the age imbalance. Consumer demand. The first thing people do as they climb out of poverty is to improve their diet. Demand for protein foods such as meat, milk, fish, and eggs from consumers with better incomes, mainly in India and China but also in Southeast Asia and Latin America, is rising rapidly. This in turn requires vastly more grain to feed the animals and fish. Overfed rich societies continue to gain weight. The average citizen of Planet Earth eats one-fifth more calories than he or she did in the 1960s — a “food footprint” growing larger by the day. Population and demand. This combination of population growth with expansion in consumer demand indicates a global requirement for food by 2050 that will be around 70–100 percent larger than it is today. Population and demand are together rising at about 2 percent a year, whereas food output is now increasing at only about 1 percent a year. These demand-side factors could probably be satisfied by the world adopting tactics similar to those of the 1960s, when the Green Revolution in farming technology was launched, were it not for the many constraints on the supply side that are now emerging to hinder or prevent such a solution: Water crisis. Put simply, civilization is running out of freshwater. Farmers presently use about 70 percent of the world’s readily available freshwater to grow food. However, increasingly megacities, with their huge thirst for water for use in homes, industry, and waste disposal, are competing with farmers for this finite resource and, by 2050, these uses could swallow half or more of the world’s available freshwater at a time when many rivers, lakes, and aquifers will be drying up. Unless major new sources or savings are found, farmers will have about half of the world’s currently available freshwater with which to grow twice the food. Land scarcity. The world is running out of good farmland. A quarter of all land is now so degraded that it is scarcely capable of yielding food. At the same time, cities are sprawling, smothering the world’s most fertile soil in concrete and asphalt, while their occupants fan out in search of cheap land for recreation that diverts the best food-producing areas from agriculture. A third category of land is poisoned by toxic industrial pollution. Much former urban food production has now ceased. The emerging global dearth of good farmland represents another severe limit on increasing food production. Nutrient losses. Civilization is hemorrhaging nutrients — substances essential to all life. Annual losses in soil erosion alone probably exceed all the nutrients applied as fertilizer worldwide. The world’s finite nutrient supplies may already have peaked. Half the fertilizer being used is wasted. In most societies, up to half the food produced is trashed or lost; so too are most of the nutrients in urban waste streams. The global nutrient cycle, which has sustained humanity throughout our history, has broken down. Energy dilemma. Advanced farming depends entirely on fossil fuels, which are likely to become very scarce and costly within a generation. At present farmers have few alternative means of producing food other than to grow fuel on their farms — which will reduce food output by 10–20 percent. Many farmers respond to higher costs simply by using less fertilizer or fuel — and so cutting yields. Driven by high energy prices and concerns about climate change, the world is likely to burn around 400 million tonnes (441 million U.S. tons) of grain as biofuels by 2020 — the equivalent of the entire global rice harvest. Oceans. Marine scientists have warned that ocean fish catches could collapse by the 2040s due to overexploitation of wild stocks. Coral reefs — whose fish help feed about five hundred million people — face decimation under global warming. The world’s oceans are slowly acidifying as carbon dioxide from the burning of fossil fuels dissolves out of the atmosphere, threatening ocean food chains. Fish farms are struggling with pollution and sediment runoff from the land. The inability of the fish sector to meet its share of a doubling in world food demand will throw a heavier burden onto land-based meat industries. Technology. For three de cades the main engine of the modern food miracle, the international scientific research that boosted crop yields, has been neglected, leading to a decline in productivity gains. Farmers worldwide are heading into a major technology pothole, with less new knowledge available in the medium run to help them to increase output. Climate. The climate is changing: up to half the planet may face regular drought by the end of the century. “Unnatural disasters” — storms, floods, droughts, and sea-level rise — are predicted to become more frequent and intense, with adventitious impacts on food security, refugee waves, and conflict. Economics, politics, and trade. Trade barriers and farm subsidies continue to distort world markets, sending the wrong price signals to farmers and discouraging investment in agriculture and its science. The globalization of food has helped drive down prices received by farmers. Speculators have destabilized commodity markets, making it riskier for farmers to make production decisions. Some countries discourage or ban food exports and others tax them, adding to food insecurity. Others pay their farmers to grow fuel instead of food. A sprawling web of health, labor, and environmental regulation is limiting farmers’ freedom to farm. The collapse in world economic conditions in late 2008 and 2009 has changed the prices of many things, including land, food, fuel, and fertilizer — but has not altered the fact that demand for food continues to grow while limits on its production multiply. Indeed, the economic crash exacerbated hunger among the world’s poor, and has not altered the fundamentals of climate change, water scarcity, population growth, land degradation, or nutrient or oil depletion. In early 2009 a report by Chatham House, a think tank focused on international affairs, observed that a lower food price “does not mean that policy-makers around the world can start to breathe a sigh of relief. . . . [E]ven at their somewhat diminished levels current prices remain acutely problematic for low-income import-dependent countries and for poor people all over the world. The World Bank estimates that higher food prices have increased the number of undernourished people by as much as 100 million from its pre-price-spike level of 850 million.” In the medium and longer term, the report warned, food prices were poised to rise again. “Although many policy-makers have taken a degree of comfort from a recent OECD-FAO report on the world’s agricultural outlook to 2017 . . . the report largely overlooked the potential impact of long-term resource scarcity trends, notably climate change, energy security and falling water availability.” To sum it all up, the challenge facing the world’s 1.8 billion women and men who grow our food is to double their output of food — using far less water, less land, less energy, and less fertilizer. They must accomplish this on low and uncertain returns, with less new technology available, amid more red tape, economic disincentives, and corrupted markets, and in the teeth of spreading drought. Achieving this will require something not far short of a miracle. Yet humans have done it before and, resilient species that we are, we can do it again. This time, however, it won’t just be a problem for farmers, scientists, and policy makers. It will be a challenge involving every single one of us, in our daily lives, our habits, and our influence at the ballot box and at the supermarket. It will be the greatest test of our global humanity and our wisdom we have yet faced

## Advantage 1

#### India growth high and resilient

Mishra 12/17/12 (Asit, Wall St Journal, "India’s economy poised to recover, says government," http://www.livemint.com/Politics/ZzgEmv958po9HI3JcVD8rI/Govt-lowers-growth-forecast-says-on-track-for-deficit.html)

While acknowledging the slow growth trends in the first half (H1) of the current fiscal, the mid-year review of the Indian economy claims: “There are, however, reasons to believe that the slowdown has bottomed out and the economy is headed towards higher growth in the second half (H2) of 2012-13.”¶ The report, which was presented in Parliament, follows a slowdown in economic growth to 5.3% in the quarter ended September from 5.5% in the preceding three months. Inflation is still above RBI’s comfort zone, while the elevated cost of money has forced companies to hold back on investments.¶ However, the review reasoned that a positive upturn in the Business Expectation Index in the October-December quarter, a higher Purchasing Managers’ Index in November, buoyancy in the capital market, improved internal accruals of the corporate sector in July-September and a resurgence of growth in the manufacturing sector suggest that the economy is poised for a moderate acceleration in H2.¶ It, therefore, concludes that the overall growth of gross domestic product (GDP) would be 5.7-5.9% for 2012-13, implying growth in H2 of the fiscal will be in the range of 6-6.4%. In H1 (April-September), growth averaged 5.4%. The economy grew 6.5% in the last fiscal.

#### PC is not key to India---drones don’t undermine because he’s ALREADY having talks with India

#### **India- Pakistan relations stable**

Ali and Imran 13

(Iftikhar Ali and Ali Imran, Writers for the Associated Press of Pakistan 9/29/13, "Sharif and Singh express desire for improved ties at 'positive' meeting", www.app.com.pk/en\_/index.php?option=com\_content&task=view&id=242383&Itemid=2, Date Accessed: 10/4/13, MSN)

Prime ministers of Pakistan and India Sunday had ‘extremely positive’ as the top political leaders expressed both their willingness and commitment to improve bilateral relations, a senior Pakistani official said. Briefing newsmen after the meeting lasting more than an hour - Foreign Secretary Jalil Abbas Jilani said the meeting aimed at creating a positive environment, conducive to pushing peace in South Asia. He said Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif called for resolution of all outstanding issues including Jammu and Kashmir dispute, foreign interference in Balochistan, Siachen, Sir Creek and water issues.¶ The prime minister emphasized that resolution of all issues including Jammu and Kashmir is certainly imperative to bring about peace and security to the region, the foreign secretary told international media.¶ While discussing recent tensions along Line of Control in disputed Jammu and Kashmir region, the top Pakistani career diplomat confirmed that the two sides agreed to establish a mechanism for not only to investigate such unfortunate incidents but also to ensure that there is no recurrence of such incidents.¶ Prime Minister Sharif underscored that there was no option but to have a sustained dialogue between the two countries.¶ Prime Minister Sharif believes in a policy of peace in the region.¶ He believes the two countries can prosper while making movement on issues which have adversely affected relations, the foreign secretary added.¶ According to Jilani, Prime Minister Sharif also extended an invitation to Manmohan Singh to visit Pakistan.¶ The foreign secretary said the question of terrorism certainly was also discussed.¶ Terrorism is as much a concern of Pakistan as of India.¶ We are aware of Indian concerns and our concerns are also well known to the Indian side (on the issue of terrorism).¶ The foreign secretary stressed that Islamabad takes all decisions under the leadership of prime minister. Let me emphasize all institutions are on the same page.¶ On the question of alleged funding sources of banned organization Jamaat ud Dawa, thre is a lot of misunderstanding going on. ¶ In compliance with of the UN Security Council imposition of sanctions, the Punjab government took control of all those institutions run by the now defunct body. ¶ He noted that a UN monitoring team has expressed full confidence in the way the taken over institutions are now run.¶ With regard to Mumbai 2008 bombing trial, he pointed out that progress on the case was slowed down because of the delay in the visit of the Pakistani Judicial Commission to India. Now that the Commission has returned after interviewing and cross-examining witnesses, it would present the findings to court and this trial would proceed forward.¶ Kashmir is an important issue that needs to be resolved, he underlined in response to a question.¶ There is no alternative to a sustained and uninterrupted dialogue, between the two countries, he emphasized.

#### No internal link between protest and a giant COUP that causes their impact

#### Alt cause to instability

Javaid 11 (Umbreen, Director Center of Asian Studies & Chairperson Department of political science University of Punjab, “Thriving Fundamentalism and Militancy in Pakistan An Analytical Overview of their Impact on the Society,” South Asian Studies, Vol. 26 No. 1. Pg. 16-17)

‘The recent increase of violence by jihadi groups, including suicide bombing of ¶ innocent bystanders as well attacks on the police and military, has perhaps brought ¶ more Pakistanis to consider how to strike a new balance between Islam and ¶ politics’ (Oldenburg, 2010: 158). ‘The Pakistani people also need to change their ¶ attitude, especially their outlook on religion. Suffered with anti-Americanism and ¶ religious fervor, Pakistanis are filtering their worldview through the prism of ¶ religion and the tensions between Islam and the West, making them to the radical ¶ propaganda and paralyzing their will to act against forces of extremism’ (Hussain, ¶ 2009: 11). mbreen Javaid Thriving Fundamentalism and ¶ 17¶ It is not only the task of the government to control this growing ¶ fundamentalism but the whole society needs to completely shun off these ¶ extremists. The political parties, intellectuals, sectarian and religious parties and ¶ the masses all have to openly condemn the extremists, so that they do not find any ¶ space to flourish. ‘Much still needs to be done on the home front curb religious ¶ zealotry and sectarianism, policies towards minorities, revision of school curricula, ¶ reconstructing ‘official’ history, promotion of universal education, and ¶ overhauling of the madrassah system’ (Niaz, 2011: 181). The best way to curtail the thriving fundamentalism in Pakistan is to look ¶ deeply into its causes. The whole society and especially the government needs to ¶ put in serious efforts in controlling on checking the causes if not diminishing ¶ them. It should also be understand that the issue of fundamentalism is very ¶ complex which entails number of factors which are playing their part. These ¶ include economic disparity, lack of education, religious ignorance, unemployment, ¶ extremism, judicial system, poor governance, ethnicity and sectarianism, ¶ corruption and alignment with United States, each of these have played their role ¶ separately and also a combined mix of all in flourishing militant fundamentalism ¶ in Pakistan. To control fundamentalism is not an easy task especially when it is ¶ now combined with militancy. Another major challenge for the government is that ¶ earlier the various militant extremist groups were operating separately and had ¶ divergent aims and objectives from each other but lately various local groups, AlQaeda and Taliban have all joined hands and helping each other irrespective of ¶ their particular objectives. These alignments have made these militant groups more ¶ lethal, thus making things more difficult for the government. ¶ Militant fundamentalism not only has the ability to destabilize Pakistan but it ¶ can, if not controlled, bring about serious security concerns for the region and also ¶ towards the global security and peace.

#### Sharif’s reforms fail, they cause too much backlash

**Rehmat 13**

(Kamran Rehat is theEditor at Dateline Islamabad, News Editor at Dawn News and earned his degree from the University of The Punjab. “Balochistan To Test Sharif’s Resolve,” http://www.gulf-times.com/opinion/189/details/356865/balochistan-to-test-sharif%E2%80%99s-resolve, Last Accessed 10/9/13) ELJ

Prime Minister Nawaz **Sharif has long proposed a national debate with a view to solving the Balochistan imbroglio**. **However, as his government is** just **beginning to discover,** it is easier said than done. **Not only will it have to first find the magic potion that reconciles rival parties and groups in the complex power structure in place right now, but also help Malik re-establish the provincial government’s writ in an area in virtual control of the security forces**. **As if there isn’t enough trouble already, the third-time prime minister is still to find his feet on the sensitive Bugti-Musharraf issue** (the latter is accused of abetting the killing of the former nationalist). Sharif remains wary of a backlash from the military establishment with **which he has traditionally been at odds in** his previous two terms over the fate of the currently detained former army chief. **This is why Sharif has gone silent** on how to deal with Musharraf -  the man directly responsible for his ouster from power in 1999 and subsequent long term in exile - despite years of vocal avowal to bring the retired general to book. It is instructive to note that **Balochistan hasn’t come to this pass all of a sudden. Years of neglect and isolation from the mainstream have inculcated a strong sense of discrimination; hence, the rebellion in disturbing hues. Unfortunately, the powers-that-be have done precious little to allay the sense of deprivation.** In fact, **the poor substitution of power in the form of the last regime headed by the thoroughly incompetent Nawab Raisani did much to nearly destroy the last vestiges of hope the province had of genuine representation.** Saturday’s dark developments should serve as a wake-up call - that is, if there is still a desire to lock heads and come up with a holistic solution. The prognosis has to be dilated upon with an open mind. **There is,** after all, **a reason why the province has become an experiment lab for foreign powers and grounds for exploitation by the enemies of the state.**

#### Doesn’t make sense---Sharif is shoring up support BECAUSE of unrestrained drone attacks

#### Balochistan stability is a lost cause---there’s no great power scenarios.

**Staff Report/Pakistan Today 12**

(Pakistan Today is a leading newspaper in Pakistan. “Balochistan May Be a Lost Cause If Corrective Measures Not Faken: Atlaf,” February 19, 2012, http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2012/02/19/news/national/altaf-links-women-empowerment-to-stronger-pakistan/, Last Accessed 10/10/13) ELJ

KARACHI - **Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) chief Altaf Hussain has said that Balochistan could be a lost cause** if drastic measures were not taken to address the grievances of the Baloch people. **Altaf said the policies of the establishment had brought the largest province of the country to the brink of separation**. He said he had been **begging the government to resolve** the **Balochistan** problem, **but no one had paid attention** to his words. “The situation has worsened to such an extent that resolutions are being passed in parliaments of other countries for granting the right to self-determination to the Baloch people,” the **MQM chief said, warning that it was already late and bold steps would have to be taken if Balochistan were to be kept with Pakistan.** He said all legitimate rights of the people of Balochistan should be granted without any delay, adding that if no solution was found, then **Balochistan might be a lost cause.**

#### No Indo/pak war

Tellis 2 Ashley, Foreign Policy Research Institute, Orbis, Winter, p. 24-5

In the final analysis, this situation is made objectively "meta-stable" by the fact that neither India, Pakistan, nor China has the strategic capabilities to execute those successful damage-limiting first strikes that might justify initiating nuclear attacks either "out of the blue" or during a crisis. Even China, which of the three comes closest to possessing such capabilities (against India under truly hypothetical scenarios), would find it difficult to conclude that the capacity for "splendid first strikes" lay within reach. Moreover, even if it could arrive at such a determination, the political justification for these actions would be substantially lacking given the nature of its current political disputes with India. On balance, therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that a high degree of deterrence stability, at least with respect to wars of unlimited aims, exists within the greater South Asian region.

#### No Pakistan collapse and it doesn't escalate

Dasgupta 13

Sunil Dasgupta is Director of the University of Maryland Baltimore County Political Science Program at the Universities at Shady Grove and non-resident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, East Asia Forum, February 25, 2013, "How will India respond to civil war in Pakistan?", http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/02/25/how-will-india-respond-to-civil-war-in-pakistan/

As it is, India and Pakistan have gone down to the nuclear edge four times — in 1986, 1990, 1999 and 2001–02. In each case, India responded in a manner that did not escalate the conflict. Any incursion into Pakistan was extremely limited. An Indian intervention in a civil war in Pakistan would be subject to the same limitations — at least so long as the Pakistani army maintains its integrity.

Given the new US–India ties, the most important factor in determining the possibility and nature of Indian intervention in a possible Pakistani civil war is Washington. If the United States is able to get Kabul and Islamabad to work together against the Taliban, as it is trying to do now, then India is likely to continue its current policy or try to preserve some influence in Afghanistan, especially working with elements of the Northern Alliance.

India and Afghanistan already have a strategic partnership agreement in place that creates the framework for their bilateral relationship to grow, but the degree of actual cooperation will depend on how Pakistan and the Taliban react. If Indian interests in Afghanistan come under attack, New Delhi might have to pull back. The Indian government has been quite clear about not sending troops to Afghanistan.

If the United States shifts its policy to where it has to choose Kabul over Islamabad, in effect reviving the demand for an independent Pashtunistan, India is likely to be much more supportive of US and Afghan goals. The policy shift, however, carries the risk of a full-fledged proxy war with Pakistan in Afghanistan, but should not involve the prospect of a direct Indian intervention in Pakistan itself.

India is not likely to initiate an intervention that causes the Pakistani state to fail. Bill Keller of the New York Times has described Pakistani president Asif Ail Zardari as overseeing ‘a ruinous kleptocracy that is spiraling deeper into economic crisis’. But in contrast to predictions of an unravelling nation, British journalist-scholar Anatol Lieven argues that the Pakistani state is likely to continue muddling through its many problems, unable to resolve them but equally predisposed against civil war and consequent state collapse. Lieven finds that the strong bonds of family, clan, tribe and the nature of South Asian Islam prevent modernist movements — propounded by the government or by the radicals — from taking control of the entire country.

Lieven’s analysis is more persuasive than the widespread view that Pakistan is about to fail as a state. The formal institutions of the Pakistani state are surprisingly robust given the structural conditions in which they operate. Indian political leaders recognise Pakistan’s resilience. Given the bad choices in Pakistan, they would rather not have anything to do with it. If there is going to be a civil war, why not wait for the two sides to exhaust themselves before thinking about intervening? The 1971 war demonstrated India’s willingness to exploit conditions inside Pakistan, but to break from tradition requires strong, countervailing logic, and those elements do not yet exist. Given the current conditions and those in the foreseeable future, India is likely to sit out a Pakistani civil war while covertly coordinating policy with the United States.

#### Pakistan is not key---your evidence is from Oracle from 5 years ago---previous instability should’ve been sufficient to trigger your impact.

## Advantage 2

#### Pakistan drones ops solve terrorism

Curtis 13 Pakistan Makes Drones Necessary, Pakistan Makes Drones Necessary, Lisa Curtis, senior research fellow at The Heritage Foundation, July 16, 2013, http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2013/7/pakistan-makes-drones-necessary

But until Islamabad cracks down more aggressively on groups attacking U.S. interests in the region and beyond, drones will remain an essential tool for fighting global terrorism. Numbering over three hundred and fifty since 2004, drone strikes in Pakistan have killed more than two dozen Al Qaeda operatives and hundreds of militants targeting U.S. and coalition forces.¶ President Obama made clear in his May 23 speech at the National Defense University that Washington would continue to use drones in Pakistan’s tribal border areas to support stabilization efforts in neighboring Afghanistan, even as it seeks to increase transparency and tighten targeting of the drone program in the future. Obama also defended the use of drones from a legal and moral standpoint, noting that by preemptively striking at terrorists, many innocent lives had been saved.¶ The most compelling evidence of the efficacy of the drone program came from Osama bin Laden himself, who shortly before his death contemplated moving Al Qaeda operatives from Pakistan into forested areas of Afghanistan in an attempt to escape the drones’ reach, according to Peter Bergen, renowned author of Manhunt: The Ten-Year Search for Bin Laden from 9/11 to Abbottabad.

#### No conclusive evidence which shows effects of drones on anti-Americanism in Pakistan- alt causes

Foust 13 Joshua Foust is a fellow at the American Security Project and the author of Afghanistan Journal: Selections from Registan.net. He is also a member of the Young Atlanticist Working Group. MORE Joshua's research focuses on the role of market-oriented development strategies in post-conflict environments, and on the development of metrics in understanding national security policy. He has written on strategic design for humanitarian interventions, decision-making in counterinsurgency, and the intelligence community's place in the national security discussion. Previous to joining ASP, Joshua worked for the U.S. intelligence community, where he focused on studying the non-militant socio-cultural environment in Afghanistan at the U.S. Army Human Terrain System, then the socio-cultural dynamics of irregular warfare movements at the National Ground Intelligence Center, and later on political violence in Yemen for the Defense Intelligence Agency. Joshua is a columnist for PBS Need to Know, and blogs about Central and South Asia at the influential blog Registan.net. A frequent commentator for American and global media, Joshua appears regularly on BBC World, Aljazeera, and international public radio. Joshua is also a regular contributor to Foreign Policy's AfPak Channel, and his writing has appeared in the New York Times, Reuters, and the Christian Science Monitor, "Understanding the Strategic and Tactical Considerations of Drone Strikes," January, 2013, americansecurityproject.org/ASP%20Reports/Ref%200110%20-%20Understanding%20the%20Strategic%20and%20Tactical%20Considerations%20of%20Drone%20Strikes.pdf, DOA: 7-20-13, y2k

Based on anecdotal evidence, drone strikes seem to cause a rise in anti-American sentiment in every country they are used. Appearances can be deceiving, however. The reality is that it is extremely difficult to single out drone strikes as a unique or even primary cause of anti-Americanism. Nevertheless, the political and social effects of drone strikes can provide an indirect means of measuring their success. In Pakistan, opposition to the drone strikes has become an issue of national politics, with an entire political party organized around ending their use.72 In Yemen, there is a growing body of anecdotal evidence that drone strikes are driving anti-Americanism and opposition to the central government.73 More broadly, airstrikes in Afghanistan – some of which come from drones – have stirred protests from both the government and from the population.74 However, these anecdotes are not conclusive about the negative effects of lethal drone strikes. In Pakistan, people protest a variety of U.S. policies they dislike, including the war in Afghanistan.75 On drones in particular, Pakistanis express a mixture of opinions. Sometimes, shocking incidents like the Raymond Davis incident can galvanize public reaction. In January of 2011, the Pakistani police caught American Raymond Davis after he killed two assailants in Lahore, Pakistan. The U.S. insisted he had been granted diplomatic immunity, which Pakistan rejected. News of his arrest quickly spread along with public disagreements from both governments over his diplomatic status. Pakistani officials began to leak sensitive information about his employment, alleging that he was an operative of the CIA76 collecting targeting information on local terrorist groups for eventual drone strikes.77 The revelations about Davis’ employment sparked public outcry78 and resulted in anti-American riots after his release from Pakistani custody: many Pakistanis expressed outrage not only that he wasn’t tried for killing two men, but that he was collecting drone intelligence in the first place.79 In contrast, reports from the tribal areas also suggest there is some guarded support from the people who live there, who seem to prefer the drone strikes over other alternatives like conventional military campaigns.80 The contrast between the two views – urban Pakistanis in the Punjab seem to hate drones, while rural Pakistanis in the tribal areas seem to guardedly support them – suggests a more complicated view of Pakistani reactions to the strikes than a simple pro- or anti-American narrative

#### Terrorists don’t care that government get consent.

#### No impact to terrorism- threats are low and SQ solves- doesn’t escalate beyond conventional weapons

Mockli 12 Daniel mockli is a Senior Researcher @ Center for Security Studies in International Relations and Security Network, "Terrorism as a Manageable Risk -- Yes it is," http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Special-Feature/Detail/?lng=en&id=152973&tabid=1453321093&contextid774=152973&contextid775=152971 9-21-13, DOA: 7-20-13, y2k

Eleven years after al-Qaida’s coor­dinated mass-casualty attacks on the US, many effects of 11 Septem­ber 2001 are still visible. Islamist extremist violence continues to be widely perceived as a major threat to global security. Recurring terrorism alerts and news about successful or foiled attacks serve as forceful remind­ers that this is a threat that could hit anyone anytime. Aviation security and infrastructure protection remain ma­jor public concerns. Counterterrorism capabilities in law enforcement, intel­ligence, and the military have all been enhanced. For all these repercussions, 9/11 has not brought about strategic change to the international system. It illustrated the globalization of security threats and the empowerment of non-state actors. It also had a tremendous im­pact on US foreign policy for several years. Yet, with the US gradually mod­ifying its counterterrorism approach, al-Qaida has not succeeded in pro­voking the West into a clash of civilizations. This is notwithstanding growing anti-Muslim and anti-Amer­ican sentiment in certain parts of the world. Nor has al-Qaida become a mass movement. The core organization of al-Qaida has been significant­ly weakened. Al-Qaida’s ideology has lost much support in Muslim coun­tries. The vast majority of Islamist extremist groups have not answered the call for global jihad and continue to pursue more local agendas. Seen from the perspective of West­ern security, Islamist extremist violence has not become an existential threat as was frequently predicted after 9/11. Rather, it should be perceived as an ongoing but manageable risk. Current counter-terrorism policies are effective to the extent that the likelihood of com­plex and catastrophic attacks against the homeland of Western countries has substantially decreased. The jihadist threat to Europe and the US no doubt remains real, with ‘home­grown’ radicals that have ties to al-Qaida-related terror organizations being a particular source of concern. However, potential terrorist attacks are likely to be limited in scale and conventional in nature over the com­ing years. Shifting from ‘managing’ to ‘resolving’ the problem of jihadist ter­rorism may be too ambitious an objective, as strategic counterterror­ism is beset with major challenges. The fight against terrorism is set to stay and will continue to require considerable resources. Yet, terrorism is a threat that should no longer be overemphasized at the expense of other security challenges. Issues relating to the transformation of the international system and regional developments in Europe, the Middle East, and elsewhere will likely top the strategic agenda of Western countries in the coming years. An evolving threat The jihadist threat has evolved significantly in the past years. The capacity of al-Qaida Central to launch complex and catastrophic attacks has been dimin­ished. Al-Qaida’s ideology and brand have, however, been taken up by some other terror organizations. These regional al-Qaida affiliates embrace the call for global jihad to some extent. But their grievances and objectives – and in most cases, also their operative range – are tied to specific local contexts. The same holds true for most other Islamist extremist groups. Al-Qaida’s concept of global jihad is being marginalized in Islamic religious and political discourse. Most of the groups that operate on the premise of jihad continue to follow the classical interpretation of a defensive struggle against oppression in Muslim coun­tries. Going after the ‘near enemy’, they still may hit not just national regimes and security forces, but also local Western targets. But they do not subscribe to al-Qaida’s reinter­pretation of jihad in global and more offensive terms. Hitting the ‘far en­emy’, i.e. launching attacks against the US homeland and other Western countries, is not what they are after. In Europe, and increasingly in the US as well, there is the additional threat of homegrown radicalization. Evidence suggests that the damage homegrown jihadists can cause de­pends significantly on whether they are self-inspired and acting autono­mously or trained and guided by established terrorist organizations. The most likely current scenarios of homegrown terrorism concern attacks of limited scale with traditional terrorist methods such as armed assault and improvised explo­sives. Overall, the diversification of Islam­ist extremist violence in recent years has rendered the jihadist threat more diffuse. It has also meant that the threat for Western homelands, while still real, has been reduced. Muslim-majority countries, rather than the West, are the main target of terrorist attacks. A largely non-Western threat The decreasing appeal of global jihad and the limited operational capacity of jihadists willing to strike European or US targets suggest a reduced scale of threat emanating from Islamist ex­tremist violence to Western countries. A typical attack in the coming years will likely be of limited scale and sophistication, carried out with con­ventional weapons like assault rifles or small improvised explosive devices. In its methods, jihadist terrorism in­creasingly resembles traditional IRA-or ETA-type terrorism. It continues to differ, however, in that it is often aimed at indiscriminate mass casual­ties and may target any country, irre­spective of secessionist conflicts. It is due to this last reason that Islamist extremist violence will likely remain a major concern to Western publics and policy-makers. It works to the advantage of al-Qaida that even failed attacks arouse public atten­tion, emotion, and fear. It is impor­tant to note, however, that it is non- OECD countries, and predominantly Muslim-majority countries, that suffer the bulk of terrorism attacks and casu­alties. In 2010, the ‘top five’ countries in terms of both attacks and deaths were Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, India, and Somalia. Collectively, they accounted for 76 per cent of all attacks and 83 per cent of all deaths. Europe and the United States rank last on this global list of terror incidents. In Europe, there have been few attacks, and the figures for arrests have been decreasing since 2006. According to Europol data covering 26 European Union (EU) member states (excluding the UK), six mem­ber states reported 294 failed, foiled, or successfully perpetrated terrorist attacks in 2009. Only one of these attacks was categorized as Islamist, as opposed to 237 attacks related to ETA in Spain and France. In the fig­ures for 2010, the number of Islam­ist attacks may go up slightly [note: in 2011, no religiously-inspired attack was reported by EU member-states], but the major trend may well be a rise in attacks by anarchist (left-wing) groups in Greece, Italy, and Spain. In the UK, there were 173 terrorism arrests in 2009/10 [note: 62 in 2011], compared to an annual average of 216 since 2002. As for the US, few would have expected that there would ‘only’ be 14 homeland deaths caused by Islamist extremist violence in the decade post- 9/11 – a figure that contrasts with the 168 people killed in the right-wing Oklahoma bombing of 1995. The bottom line is that while jihad­ist terrorism hits hard some of the Muslim countries, it is a manageable risk in Western countries. There is of course a price tag attached to manag­ing this risk effectively. Also, new large-scale attacks on West­ern homelands can never be ruled out. Nevertheless, the likelihood of such an attack appears lower today than some counterterrorist bureaucracies and analysts continue to argue. This is also why two worst-case scenarios are unlikely today: for example, links between anti-Western Muslim re­gimes and global jihadists have not materialized in any substantial way. Iran does support Hezbollah and Hamas, but has been tough on Al Qaeda. Nor did Saddam Hussein cooperate with global jihadists. There are ties between the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and al-Qaida and Lashkar-e-Taiba in Pakistan. Yet, these are tactical alliances that are not geared against the West, but must be seen in the context of the ISI’s strate­gic calculations concerning Pakistan’s relations with India. Without state sponsorship of global jihadism, the scenario of terrorism based on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) appears unlikely too. Again, there are concerns about the safety of nuclear weapons, especially should Pakistan descend into political chaos. US President Barack Obama’s characterization of nuclear terrorism as ‘the most extreme threat to global security’ is cer­tainly justified, and there is no doubt that a WMD attack could be a game-changer in international relations. But it is doubtful that Obama is also right in calling this ‘the most immediate threat’. Getting the materials and the know-how to launch an effective WMD attack remains exceedingly difficult. As for the use of conventional explosives to disperse radioactive materials, such ‘dirty bombs’ are unlikely to cause mass casualties, though they may cause mass panic.

#### Terrorist groups don’t have the structure or strength to pull off a major attack

Meuller and Stewart 12 (John Mueller is Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies and Adjunct Professor in the Department of Political Science, both at Ohio State University, and Senior Fellow at¶ the Cato Institute in Washington, D.C. Mark G. Stewart is Australian Research Council Professorial Fellow¶ and Professor and Director at the Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability at the University of¶ Newcastle in Australia. “The terrorism delusion: America’s overwrought response to 9/11” International Security, 37:1, Summer 2012, MT)

In fact, it is unclear whether al-Qaida central, now holed up in Pakistan and¶ under sustained attack, has done much of anything since September 11 except¶ issue videos ªlled with empty, self-infatuated, and essentially delusional¶ threats. For example, it was in October 2002 that Osama bin Laden proclaimed,¶ “Understand the lesson of New York and Washington raids, which came in response to some of your previous crimes. . . . God is my witness, the youth of¶ Islam are preparing things that will ªll your hearts with fear. They will target¶ key sectors of your economy until you stop your injustice and aggression or¶ until the more short-lived of us die.” And in January 2006, he insisted that the¶ “delay” in carrying out operations in the United States “was not due to failure¶ to breach your security measures,” and that “operations are under preparation, and you will see them on your own ground once they are ªnished, God¶ willing.”18¶ Bin Laden’s tiny group of 100 or so followers does appear to have served as¶ something of an inspiration to some Muslim extremists, may have done some¶ training, has contributed a bit to the Taliban’s far larger insurgency in Afghanistan, and may have participated in a few terrorist acts in Pakistan.19 In his examination of the major terrorist plots against the West since September 11,¶ Mitchell Silber finds only two (cases 1 and 20) that could be said to be under¶ the “command and control” of al-Qaida central (as opposed to ones suggested,¶ endorsed, or inspired by the organization), and there are questions about how¶ full its control was even in these two instances.20¶ This highly limited record suggests that Carle was right in 2008 when he¶ warned, “We must not take fright at the specter our leaders have exaggerated.¶ In fact, we must see jihadists for the small, lethal, disjointed and miserable opponents that they are.” Al-Qaida “has only a handful of individuals capable of¶ planning, organizing and leading a terrorist organization,” and although it has¶ threatened attacks, “its capabilities are far inferior to its desires.”21 Impressively, bin Laden appears to have remained in a state of self-delusion even to¶ his brutal and abrupt end. He continued to cling to the belief that another attack such as September 11 might force the United States out of the Middle East,¶ and he was unfazed that the first such effort had proven to be spectacularly¶ counterproductive in this respect by triggering a deadly invasion of his base in¶ Afghanistan and an equally deadly pursuit of his operatives.22¶ Other terrorist groups around the world afªliated or aligned or otherwise¶ connected to al-Qaida may be able to do intermittent damage to people and infrastructure, but nothing that is very sustained or focused. In all, extremist¶ Islamist terrorism—whether associated with al-Qaida or not—has claimed 200¶ to 400 lives yearly worldwide outside war zones. That is 200 to 400 too many,¶ of course, but it is about the same number as bathtub drownings every year in¶ the United States.23¶ In addition to its delusional tendencies, al-Qaida has, as Patrick Porter notes,¶ a “talent at self-destruction.”24 With the September 11 attacks and subsequent¶ activity, bin Laden and his followers mainly succeeded in uniting the world,¶ including its huge Muslim population, against their violent global jihad.25¶ These activities also turned many radical Islamists against them, including¶ some of the most prominent and respected.26

#### No retaliation

Davis and Jenkins 2 Paul K., Professor – RAND Corporation and Research Leader – Naval Studies Board, and Brian M., Special Advisor – RAND Corporation and International Chamber of Commerce, RAND Research Paper,

http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1619/MR1619.pdf

Deterring acquisition and use of WMD is profoundly important and difficult. Terrorists appear to have grandiose intentions, and some have intense interest in such weapons. Moreover, they may believe that they have what a Cold War theorist would call “escalation dominance.” That is, al Qaeda could use WMD against the United States, but retaliation—and certainly escalation— would be difficult because (1) the United States will not use chemical, biological, or radiological weapons; (2) its nuclear weapons will seldom be suitable for use; and (3) there are no good targets (the terrorists themselves fade into the woodwork). And, of course, the United States has constraints. Although this gap in the deterrent framework is dismissed by some, we regard it as very dangerous.

#### Err on the side of terrorist failure- 90% risk

Michael Levi, 4/17/2007, is David M. Rubenstein Senior Fellow for Energy and the Environment and Director of the Program on Energy Security and Climate Change, CFR, “ <http://www.cfr.org/weapons-of-mass-destruction/likely-nuclear-terrorist-attack-united-states/p13097>

We should not, however, underestimate the odds of terrorist failure. There isn’t enough space here to make that point comprehensively, but I’ll try to convince you that simple arguments for why failure is highly unlikely may be weaker than they seem. The case for the ease of building a gun-type weapon provides a good example of how we often overestimate how easy a terrorist task may be. I certainly won’t debate the fact that Manhattan Project scientists “were so confident about this design that they persuaded military authorities to drop the bomb, untested, on Hiroshima.” But we should parse the word “untested” carefully. During the Manhattan Project, scientists and engineers spent years testing the gun itself; testing their casting and machining of the uranium metal to avoid fires and criticality accidents during production, and impurities in the product; testing the initiator that would trigger the chain reaction; and testing how different configurations of materials would behave, a project that led to the death of one physicist. No one conducted a full-scale test explosion, but that hardly means that building the weapon was trivial. A terrorist group would have to do many of the same things (though technological progress would make some steps easier) all while attempting to hide from law enforcement and intelligence. This doesn’t mean that terrorists couldn’t build a gun-type bomb, but it suggests that their chances of failure aren’t negligible. This takes on special importance in the context of a broader defense. Imagine a terrorist group faces only a twenty percent chance of failure while building a bomb. But imagine it also faces a similarly small chance of failure while attempting to purchase nuclear materials, while attempting to recruit scientists and engineers, while raising money for its plot, while smuggling materials into the United States, while purchasing non-nuclear components for its weapon, while assembling the bomb in a safehouse, and in other elements of its plot. If we combine, for example, ten such hurdles, we get a ninety percent chance of failure. We can debate the numbers, but this suggests that we shouldn’t be too quick to ignore small chances of terrorist failure.

#### No loose nukes

Zenko and Cohen 12 [Micah Zenko is a Fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations, Michael A. Cohen is a Fellow at the Century Foundation, "Clear and Present Safety: The United States is More Secure Than Washington Thinks,” 91 Foreign Aff. 79 2012, HeinOnline]cd

In the past decade, Cheney and other one-percenters have frequently¶ warned of the danger posed by loose nukes or uncontrolled¶ fissile material. In fact, the threat of a nuclear device ending up in the¶ hands of a terrorist group has diminished markedly since the early¶ 1990s, when the Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal was dispersed across all¶ of Russia's u time zones, all 15 former Soviet¶ republics, and much of eastern Europe. Since Washington should¶ then, cooperative U.S.-Russian efforts have¶ resulted in the substantial consolidation of not assume that¶ those weapons at far fewer sites and in com- every problem in¶ prehensive security upgrades at almost all the the world demands¶ facilities that still possess nuclear material or¶ warheads, making the possibility of theft a U.S. response.¶ or diversion unlikely. Moreover, the lessons¶ learned from securing Russia's nuclear arsenal are now being applied¶ in other countries, under the framework of Obama's April 2010 Nuclear¶ Security Summit, which produced a global plan to secure all¶ nuclear materials within four years. Since then, participants in the plan,¶ including Chile, Mexico, Ukraine, and Vietnam, have fulfilled more¶ than 70 percent of the commitments they made at the summit.¶ Pakistan represents another potential source of loose nukes. The¶ United States' military strategy in Afghanistan, with its reliance on¶ drone strikes and cross-border raids, has actually contributed to instability¶ in Pakistan, worsened U.S. relations with Islamabad, and potentially¶ increased the possibility of a weapon falling into the wrong hands.¶ Indeed, Pakistani fears of a U.S. raid on its nuclear arsenal have reportedly¶ led Islamabad to disperse its weapons to multiple sites, transporting¶ them in unsecured civilian vehicles. But even in Pakistan, the chances of¶ a terrorist organization procuring a nuclear weapon are infinitesimally¶ small. The U.S. Department of Energy has provided assistance to¶ improve the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, and successive senior¶ U.S. government officials have repeated what former Secretary of¶ Defense Robert Gates said in January 2010: that the United States is¶ very comfortable with the security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons."

#### No Central Asia war

Collins and Wohlforth 4 Kathleen, Professor of Political Science – Notre Dame and William, Professor of Government – Dartmouth, “Defying ‘Great Game’ Expectations”, Strategic Asia 2003-4: Fragility and Crisis, p. 312-313

Conclusion The popular great game lens for analyzing Central Asia fails to capture the declared interests of the great powers as well as the best reading of their objective interests in security and economic growth. Perhaps more importantly, it fails to explain their actual behavior on the ground, as well the specific reactions of the Central Asian states themselves. Naturally, there are competitive elements in great power relations. Each country’s policymaking community has slightly different preferences for tackling the challenges presented in the region, and the more influence they have the more able they are to shape events in concordance with those preferences. But these clashing preferences concern the means to serve ends that all the great powers share. To be sure, policy-makers in each capital would prefer that their own national firms or their own government’s budget be the beneficiaries of any economic rents that emerge from the exploitation and transshipment of the region’s natural resources. But the scale of these rents is marginal even for Russia’s oil-fueled budget. And for taxable profits to be created, the projects must make sense economically—something that is determined more by markets and firms than governments. Does it matter? The great game is an arresting metaphor that serves to draw people’s attention to an oft-neglected region. The problem is the great-game lens can distort realities on the ground, and therefore bias analysis and policy. For when great powers are locked in a competitive fight, the issues at hand matter less than their implication for the relative power of contending states. Power itself becomes the issue—one that tends to be nonnegotiable. Viewing an essential positive-sum relationship through zero sum conceptual lenses will result in missed opportunities for cooperation that leaves all players—not least the people who live in the region—poorer and more insecure. While cautious realism must remain the watchword concerning an impoverished and potentially unstable region comprised of fragile and authoritarian states, our analysis yields at least conditional and relative optimism. Given the confluence of their chief strategic interests, the major powers are in a better position to serve as a stabilizing force than analogies to the Great Game or the Cold War would suggest. It is important to stress that the region’s response to the profoundly destabilizing shock of coordinated terror attacks was increased cooperation between local governments and China and Russia, and—multipolar rhetoric notwithstanding—between both of them and the United States. If this trend is nurtured and if the initial signals about potential SCO-CSTO-NATO cooperation are pursued, another destabilizing shock might generate more rather than less cooperation among the major powers. Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan are clearly on a trajectory that portends longer-term cooperation with each of the great powers. As military and economic security interests become more entwined, there are sound reasons to conclude that “great game” politics will not shape Central Asia’s future in the same competitive and destabilizing way as they have controlled its past. To the contrary, mutual interests in Central Asia may reinforce the broader positive developments in the great powers’ relations that have taken place since September 11, as well as reinforce regional and domestic stability in Central Asia.

## Solvency

#### Pakistan consents to US drone strikes

Groves 13 Steven Groves, April 10, 2013, Bernard and Barbara Lomas Senior Research Fellow, He has testified before Congress on international law, human rights, the United Nations and U.N. peacekeeping operations) Drone Strikes: The Legality of U.S. Targeting Terrorists Abroad, Backgrounder on Terrorism, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/drone-strikes-the-legality-of-us-targeting-terrorists-abroad

In September 2012, *The Wall Street Journal* reported that the U.S. and Pakistani governments have an arrangement that permits the United States to target al-Qaeda and Taliban militants operating from the FATA while allowing Pakistani officials to maintain a level of consensual ambiguity.[[30]](http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/drone-strikes-the-legality-of-us-targeting-terrorists-abroad" \l "_ftn30) According to the press report, for many years the CIA has faxed the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan’s intelligence service, on a regular basis to outline “broad areas” of airspace within Pakistan where the United States intends to conduct drone strikes. Without formally endorsing a drone strike, the ISI would acknowledge receipt of the fax and clear the airspace identified by the CIA, thereby giving implied if not express consent to the United States to conduct drone operations

#### Obama can circumvent the plan- covert loopholes

Lohmann 1-28-13 [Julia, director of the Harvard Law National Security Research Committee, BA in political science from the University of California, Berkeley, “Distinguishing CIA-Led from Military-Led Targeted Killings,” <http://www.lawfareblog.com/wiki/the-lawfare-wiki-document-library/targeted-killing/effects-of-particular-tactic-on-issues-related-to-targeted-killings/>]

The U.S. military—in particular, the Special Operations Command (SOCOM), and its subsidiary entity, the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC)—is responsible for carrying out military-led targeted killings.¶ Military-led targeted killings are subject to various legal restrictions, including a complex web of statutes and executive orders. For example, because the Covert Action Statute does not distinguish among institutions undertaking covert actions, targeted killings conducted by the military that fall within the definition of “covert action” set forth in 50 U.S.C. § 413(b) are subject to the same statutory constraints as are CIA covert actions. 50 U.S.C. § 413b(e). However, as Robert Chesney explains, many military-led targeted killings may fall into one of the CAS exceptions—for instance, that for traditional military activities—so that the statute’s requirements will not always apply to military-led targetings. Such activities are exempted from the CAS’s presidential finding and authorization requirements, as well as its congressional reporting rules.¶ Because such unacknowledged military operations are, in many respects, indistinguishable from traditional covert actions conducted by the CIA, this exception may provide a “loophole” allowing the President to circumvent existing oversight mechanisms without substantively changing his operational decisions. However, at least some military-led targetings do not fall within the CAS exceptions, and are thus subject to that statute’s oversight requirements. For instance, Chesney and Kenneth Anderson explain, some believe that the traditional military activities exception to the CAS only applies in the context of overt hostilities, yet it is not clear that the world’s tacit awareness that targeted killing operations are conducted (albeit not officially acknowledged) by the U.S. military, such as the drone program in Pakistan, makes those operations sufficiently overt to place them within the traditional military activities exception, and thus outside the constraints of the CAS.¶ Chesney asserts, however, that despite the gaps in the CAS’s applicability to military-led targeted killings, those targetings are nevertheless subject to a web of oversight created by executive orders that, taken together, largely mirrors the presidential authorization requirements of the CAS. But, this process is not enshrined in statute or regulation and arguably could be changed or revoked by the President at any time. Moreover, this internal Executive Branch process does not involve Congress or the Judiciary in either ex ante or ex post oversight of military-led targeted killings, and thus, Philip Alston asserts, it may be insufficient to provide a meaningful check against arbitrary and overzealous Executive actions.